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Recent estimates of the intergenerational correlation of income in the United States 
are centered around 0.6. Existing empirical work is only able to explain about half of 
this correlation. The first chapter of this dissertation provides a behavioral 
explanation that accounts for almost half of the unexplained correlation. 
Heterogeneous agents in the model are loss averse and must choose their education 
level after learning their “earning ability” and inheriting a reference level of 
consumption and bequest from the previous generation. These agents make education 
choices in part to avoid losses relative to reference consumption in the first and 
second periods of their lives. Agents with high inherited reference consumption 
choose high levels of education in order to avoid losses in the second period and are 
therefore likely to have high income and consumption themselves. Those with very 
low reference consumption are likely to get more education than those in the middle 
of the reference consumption distribution, as they are less likely to experience a loss 
in the first period. I find support for this U-shaped education decision rule using the 
 
NLSY97 data set. The dissertation also tries to answer the question of why black and 
white workers display significant differences in their labor market outcomes. Black 
workers tend to have less education and earn lower income than their white 
counterparts at each level of education. The second chapter explores three 
possibilities (wage discrimination, lower earning ability, and low aspirations) for 
these gaps within the framework of a model with loss aversion and inherited 
reference consumption. When people have loss-averse preferences, low aspirations 
lead to lower levels of chosen education. Loss aversion and low aspirations can lead 
to education outcomes similar to those caused by outright discrimination or lower 
earnings ability. When combined with wage discrimination the model can also help 
explain the larger poverty trap and lower affluence net in black families as opposed to 
white families. Simulation results compare favorably to intergenerational quintile 
transition rates in the literature. The model takes many generations to reach 
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Recent estimates of the intergenerational correlation of income in the United States
are centered around 0.6. Existing empirical work looking at the effects of parental
income on IQ, schooling, wealth, race, and personality is only able to explain about
half of this correlation. This paper provides a possible behavioral explanation that
could account for almost half of the unexplained correlation. The model has sequen-
tial generations in which heterogeneous agents are loss averse and must choose their
education level after learning their “earning ability” and inheriting a reference level of
consumption and bequest from the previous generation. These borrowing-constrained
agents make education investment choices in part to avoid losses relative to reference
consumption in the first and second periods of their lives rather than to maximize
lifetime resources. Agents with high inherited reference consumption choose high lev-
els of education in order to avoid losses in the second period and are therefore likely
to have high income and consumption themselves. Those with very low reference
consumption are likely to get more education than those in the middle of the ref-
erence consumption distribution, as the opportunity cost of forgone earnings during
schooling is less likely to cause them to experience a loss in the first period. I find
support for this U-shaped education decision rule using the NLSY97 data set. I sim-
ulate the model assuming zero correlation of earning ability between generations and
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show that it can explain approximately one-half of the unexplained intergenerational
correlation of income. The model also offers an explanation for why we see in the
data a minor poverty trap for white families, in which children from poor families are
likely to remain poor, and a significant affluence net, in which those from rich families
are more likely to stay at the top of the income distribution.
1.1 Introduction
A free market system can create a large amount of income inequality. The top 1%
of earners in the United States earned 12.4% of the total wage income in the United
States in 2007 (Piketty and Saez 2009). Acceptance of this system, especially in the
United States, is generally predicated on the idea that each person has a good chance
of success, no matter his starting point. However, recent research (e.g. Mazumder
2005, Mulligan 1997) shows that the correlation of income between parents and chil-
dren is around 0.6. As Mazumder (2005) notes, at this level it will take six generations
for the descendants of someone at 25% or 200% of the mean to be within five percent
of the average.1 Furthermore, Hertz (2005) shows that there is a significant affluence
net, in which children of parents with income in the top decile have a high chance of
remaining in at least the top quintile, while those with parents in the bottom decile
are very likely to be poor themselves, caught in the well-documented poverty trap.
Both Hertz and Mazumder (2008) show that white and black families experience quite
different, and asymmetric, transition rates which would not be implied by a linear
1Becker and Tomes (1986) review a number of studies that find an intergenerational correlation
of less than 0.2. At this level it would take only two generations for the descendants of someone at
200% of the mean to be within 5% of the average. Unfortunately, these studies suffered from a lack
of data so that estimates of lifetime income were much noisier than in recent studies. Mazumder
(2005) is able to use up to 16 years of father’s income, averaging out the noise of transitory income,
and finds an intergenerational correlation of 0.6. Other studies use instrumental variable methods
and get similar estimates.
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model with a correlation of 0.6.
Theoretically, there are a number of reasons why parents’ and children’s income
(and education) may be correlated across generations. Those parents with more ed-
ucation will also tend to have more income, out of which they can pay for more (and
higher quality) education for their children. Parents with fewer financial resources
(who will also tend to have lower education) will be less able to finance the education
of their children. The problem with this explanation is that it assumes imperfect
capital markets in financing education. Given the high correlation between education
and income, markets should (and do) exist to finance education expenses. According
to data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES 2008), over 40% of
post-secondary students receive student loans, which average over $5,700 yearly for
students at private schools and $4,200 for those at public colleges and universities.
In addition, between 25% and 35% of students at in-state public universities receive
government and/or institution grants which average almost $3,400 for institutional
grants and $2,400 and $3,200 for state and federal government grants, respectively.
The typical tuition and room and board at a four-year public school was just under
$13,000 in 2007-08, so that many students could finance a large part of their edu-
cational expense between grants and loans (all data from NCES 2008). Of course,
there is the possibility, explored in this paper as well as others, that capital markets
for education are not perfect and that lower-income families may face more severe
borrowing constraints than higher income families. If children from poorer families
find it more difficult to borrow, this may be one transmission mechanism by which
parental income affects child income. And because loans are only available for higher
education, children from lower-income families may receive an inferior early education
if forced into low-quality public schools. This could generate a poverty trap in which
those with the desire and ability to pursue higher education would be unable to do
so due to this borrowing constraint.
3
There is a reasonable question as to how important genetic factors are in trans-
mitting income from one generation to the next. Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne Groves
(2005) conduct a meta-analysis of the empirical literature in an attempt to identify the
causes of this intergenerational correlation. Their research shows that transmission
of intelligence, as measured by IQ, actually plays a very minor role, while school-
ing and, unfortunately, race, play a more substantial role. Yet their analysis is still
only able to account for approximately half of the observed intergenerational correla-
tion of income. Bowles et al. show that the genetic transmission of IQ (despite being
fairly high) is less important in transmitting income than one would perhaps suppose,
because IQ and earnings are not very highly correlated. However, their paper also
shows that there are other inheritable factors that contribute to the determination of
income, such as good (or poor) work habits, which may be passed on genetically but
also can be passed from one generation to the next culturally.
This paper proposes a novel transmission mechanism between parents and children
that focuses on the differences in expectations, or habit formation, among children
from different income levels. If children form a reference level of consumption during
childhood (based on family consumption) and measure utility in reference to this level,
then children of identical ability from different backgrounds may make very different
education investments. Specifically, if people have loss-averse utility functions, so
that they are risk averse in gains but risk loving in losses, then children from higher-
income families will choose higher education than an otherwise identical person from
a poorer family. Those at the very bottom of the income distribution will invest more
in education than those immediately above them as they find it easier to replace
reference consumption, generating a U-shaped education investment decision.
As a hypothetical example, imagine identical twins, Joe and Thomas, who are
separated at birth. Joe is adopted by a working-class family while Thomas is adopted
by a family from the upper-middle class. Suppose both are interested in electrical
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work, have similar SAT scores and grades, and have an equal cost of financing their
education. They face two possible education and career paths.
One possibility for these hypothetical twins, after finishing high school, is becom-
ing an electrician through an apprenticeship that allows one to work and earn a small
amount while becoming qualified to take the licensing exam, after which one can
earn around $20 an hour. The other option is a four-year college to get a degree in
electrical engineering. This requires a large upfront expense which would have to be
financed mainly through loans that would be paid back after finishing the program.
This would require consuming at a low level while in school and while paying back
the loans, but afterwards earning $35 an hour.
The model presented below asserts that Joe is more likely to choose the electrician
route, while Thomas is more likely to choose to become an electrical engineer. The
key to this result is that preferences are assumed to be loss averse, while reference
consumption is determined by family income during childhood. Joe has a lower level
of reference consumption and can enjoy a similar or higher consumption early in life
by becoming an electrician, whereas going to school would force him to consume
below reference as a young adult. Thomas has higher reference consumption. If he
becomes an electrician he would consume below reference his entire life. If he goes to
college and becomes an electrical engineer, he will at least be able to equal or exceed
reference consumption in his later life.
More generally, people with loss-averse preferences and a low level of reference
consumption will invest less in costly education in the first, or education, period of
their life in order to avoid first-period losses (compared to their reference level of
consumption), even though this will mean reducing the gains in the second, or work,
period of life. A person with a high level of reference consumption is much more
likely to face losses in one or both periods of life. In order to eliminate (or at least
reduce) this loss in the second period of life, the higher-reference person will choose
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a higher level of education so as to maximize resources in the second period. This
choice will lead to a correlation of income (and education and consumption) across
generations even if earning ability is independent across generations. On the other
hand, a model with habit formation but without loss aversion will only be able to
generate intergenerational persistence if borrowing constraints are extremely severe
or the curvature of the utility function is quite pronounced. In order to generate a
positive intergenerational correlation of income, consuming at a loss needs to have a
high enough utility cost compared to future gains that people are willing to reduce
total lifetime consumption by investing in less education in order to avoid a first-
period loss.
Some sociologists have interviewed those who were qualified for higher education
but who didn’t go on to a four-year college. In a survey, Connor (2001) finds that
40% of qualified UK students who didn’t go on to university, and who had a lower
socio-economic status than those who did, stated the desire to start working and earn
money as a reason for their decision. One said:
“what’s the point slogging your guts out and there’s no guarantee you will
get a job whereas I believe in these next three years I will have started and
worked a lot higher than [he] will have when he come out of university .
. .”
Another study looks at students from the Chicago Public Schools (CCSR 2008) who
also tended to come from lower socio-economic backgrounds. One student, whom
the authors call Javier, had a 3.95 GPA, scored 21 on the ACT, and even had a
scholarship to a four-year business school. He decided to go to a technical school
offering an 18-month automotive certification instead. He said:
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“I decided to go to UTI because I was more interested in the program,
and it’s less time. The other colleges would have been three or four years.
I just want to get the studies over with and go to work.”
In a study of those in Appalachia, one of the poorer rural areas in the United States,
Brown et al (2009) interviewed one student who clearly expressed the desire for certain
types of consumption that would be unavailable if he were to go to college.
“So, I mean, we have to work for stuff! If I go off to college though, and I
am in college full-time, there’s no way I can work. So who’s going to pay
for my truck? Who’s going to pay for all my bills that I have?”
In addition, a study by Hahn and Price (2008) for the Institute of Higher Education
Policy found that “within the non-college-going population, almost half of Black and
FRPL [low-income] students...stated that the need to work was “extremely” or “very”
important, compared with an average of 38 percent for all non-college-goers. This
greater need to work did not appear to be the result of greater family obligations for
minority and low-income students.”
This evidence suggests that the utility cost of foregone earnings and consumption
is an important determinant of education choices for some young adults. But is there
evidence that reference consumption depends on a person’s level of consumption as
a child? Some papers in the literature on aspirations assume this to be the case
(e.g. de la Croix, 2000) while others view aspirations as coming from those around
them or above them in the income distribution. Genicot and Ray (2009) use an
S-shaped utility function (à la loss aversion) but assume that parents choose their
children’s education investment and that aspirations are a function of the future
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income distribution rather than the past. However, Waldkirch et al (2004) use the
PSID to measure intergenerational consumption patterns and find that, controlling
for parent and child income, consumption reference levels are correlated with the
consumption of the previous generation. Additionally, McGrath et al (2001) look
at the educational aspirations of rural youth in Iowa. Among middle class families,
education aspirations and outcomes are similar for the children of the more educated
professional middle class and for the children of the less educated farming middle
class. These education aspirations and outcomes are both higher than for the group
of children whose parents have lower socio-economic status. In a world in which
the path to middle-class income goes increasingly through higher education, these
children of less educated middle class farmers appear to choose college as a way
to maintain their higher place in the income distribution. While there is no direct
evidence that students have loss averse preferences when making their education
investment decision, the examples cited above are suggestive. It is certainly possible
that loss aversion plays a role in this important investment choice.
Formally, I develop a model with sequential generations in which heterogeneous
agents are loss averse and inherit their reference level of consumption from their par-
ents. There are two main periods in life: an education period and a work period.
There is no uncertainty for agents in the model so that wages are completely deter-
mined by observable earning ability and education (which act as complements). The
model also allows for the parent generation to give a “warm glow” bequest to the child
generation which may be used for education or consumption. A number of different
types of borrowing constraints are explored as well. The baseline model allows agents
to borrow the complete (direct) cost of education, although agents cannot borrow to
finance consumption. I also present results for cases in which there are no borrowing
constraints and in which the bottom of the income distribution does not have access
to financial markets.
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The baseline model with loss aversion and weak borrowing constraints is able to
generate an intergenerational correlation of wages of 0.14 even when earning abil-
ity is completely independent between generations, suggesting that loss aversion is
one possible explanation for the unexplained income correlation between generations.
In contrast, a model with standard concave utility and habit formation generates
basically no correlation of income under weak borrowing constraints. Only when bor-
rowing constraints are much more severe can the model with habit formation and
standard concave preferences generate a similar level of intergenerational correlation
of earnings. On the other hand, when there are no borrowing constraints, none of my
models generate an intergenerational correlation of wages. Intuitively, if agents can
borrow to finance consumption, they can avoid losses in the first period and should
always invest in the level of education that maximizes lifetime discounted earnings.
The model with loss aversion generates a possibly counter-intuitive, but testable,
implication for education investment decisions. Because those at the bottom of the
parental income distribution, with very low levels of reference consumption, will find it
easier to consume without a loss in the first period of life, even if they go to school, they
will tend to invest in more education than those who are slightly above them in the
parental income distribution. As described above, those with high levels of reference
consumption will tend to get more education to avoid a loss in the second period of life.
This generates a U-shaped decision rule in education with family consumption as the
explanatory variable. In contrast, the model with habit formation but without loss
aversion will generate either a flat or upward sloping education decision, depending
on the severity of borrowing constraints. I test this implication using the NLSY97
data set and find support for a quadratic, U-shaped decision rule in education. I
use average family income before the respondent’s 18th birthday as the explanatory
variable and control for own ability and parental education.
The next section describes the model with particular attention to the assumption
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of loss-averse preferences. In section three I discuss relevant data moments from the
intergenerational persistence literature, which I will use to test my model. These
moments include the correlations of income, education, and consumption across gen-
erations as well as non-linearities in the transition matrix between income quantiles,
especially the poverty trap and the affluence net. The calibration is presented in
section four along with simulated results for both the model with loss aversion and
the model with only habit formation. The former is able to generate a positive cor-
relation of intergenerational income mainly due to an affluence net, in which the
children of the rich choose to get more education than the children of the poor and
so have higher earnings. This matches the data for white families fairly well, but
cannot explain the different outcomes experienced by black families, who face a sig-
nificant poverty trap. Section five presents the empirical results from the NLSY97
which support the U-shaped education decision rule implied by the theoretical model.
Section six offers a conclusion and a number of avenues for further research, including
the mechanisms I explore in Malloy (2009) to explain persistent differences in group
outcomes, especially between white and black families.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Basic Setup
The model presented here is a fairly straightforward partial-equilibrium model with
sequential generations. Agents live for three periods. The first period, labeled 0,
can be thought of as childhood, in which agents do not have to make any decisions.
Children learn their earning ability level, ψ, their reference consumption level, c0,
and the bequest, T , that they will receive at the beginning of period one. Both
the reference level of consumption and the bequest come directly from their parents.
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Earning ability differs across agents and is normally distributed:
ψi = ρψi−1 + (1 − ρ)ψ̄ + χi
χi ∼ N(0, (1 − ρ
2)σ2ψ)
I assume, in the baseline model, that earning ability is independent across generations.
That is, a child’s earning ability is completely independent of the earning ability of
the parent so that ρ = 0. Thus each agent draws a random earning ability from a
normal distribution with mean ψ̄ and standard deviation σψ.
The second period of life, labeled 1, is the education period. Agents, knowing their
earning ability, reference consumption, and bequest, invest in education to maximize
lifetime utility. Because there is no uncertainty in this model, agents are also able
to choose consumption in periods 1 and 2, saving (or borrowing) between periods,
and the bequest level they will leave to the next generation. The value function is
described by equation 1.
V (c0, T, ψ) = max
e,c1,c2,T ′
U(z1) + β[U(z2) +B(T
′)] (1a)
s.t.
s ≥ Ω (1b)
ε(e) ≤ T + Ω (1c)
c1 + s+ ε(e) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T (1d)
c2 + T
′ = ω(e, ψ) + s(1 + r) (1e)
c1, c2, T
′ ≥ 0 (1f)





Note that this gives a natural minimum to zt of -1, which is important when thinking
about loss aversion, as discussed below. The level of education is e, and the function
B(·) measures the warm glow utility derived from giving a bequest, T ′, to the next
generation. The wage is determined by ω(·, ·) which I assume to have the form:
ln[ω(e, ψ)] = α1e+ α2e
2 + ζeψ + κψ (2)
Where I assume that α1, α2, ζ, κ ≥ 0. This is a fairly standard semi-log wage
function that is quadratic in education. The major difference between equation (2)
and a more standard wage function from the labor literature is that earning ability,
ψ, is observable. The parameter ζ represents the idea captured in quantile wage
regressions (e.g. Lemieux 2006) that the return to education is higher for those with
higher earning ability. The cost function for education is given by:
ε(e) = φ1e+ φ2e
2 (3)
With φ1, φ2 ≥ 0 so that education costs are at least weakly convex. The wage
function and the education function assure that there is some level of education, e∗,
which may be at a corner, that uniquely maximizes lifetime resources for each level
of earning ability, ψ.
The first two constraints in equation (1) reflect potential borrowing constraints,
where borrowing is less than some level Ω (discussed below) and where the agent may
only use her bequest and her borrowing in order to finance the education expense,
ε(e). The two constraints (1d) and (1e) represent the per period budget constraints,
where agents are not allowed to die in debt and the final constraint ensures that
consumption and bequests are non-negative. Savings are assumed to grow at a risk-
free rate r. Agents face both a direct cost of education, ε(e), and an opportunity
cost of education so that they work only (1 − e) in the first period. The wage per
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unit of time worked is the same in both periods and depends on the chosen level of
education, e. Because the wage is increasing in the chosen level of education, this
opportunity cost is also convex.
The first order conditions for each agent are straightforward and are given in
equation (4).
e : −[ω(e, ψ) + ε′(e)]U ′(z1) + ωe(e, ψ)U
′(z2) + γ2ε
′(e)[ε(e) − T − Ω] ≥ 0 (4a)
s : −U ′(z1) + β(1 + r)U
′(z2) + γ1 = 0 (4b)
T ′ : β[−U ′(z2) +B
′(T ′)] = 0 (4c)
γ1 : s+ Ω ≥ 0 (4d)
γ2 : T + Ω ≤ ε(e) (4e)
Equation (4a) characterizes the utility-maximizing level of education, where γ2
is the multiplier on the education-financing constraint, so long as U(·) is concave.
Equation (4b) gives the standard intertemporal Euler equation where γ1 is the mul-
tiplier on the borrowing constraint (1b), (4c) gives the intratemporal Euler equation
between consumption and bequests and (4d) and (4e) are the borrowing constraints.
However, as will be discussed in more detail below, if agents have loss averse prefer-
ences, then U(z) is convex in losses. In this case, the second order condition for a
maximum fails and the FOCs cannot be used to solve the system.
The connection between the generations is straightforward. In period 2, agents
reproduce so that the next generation’s period 0 will match up with period 2 of
the previous generation. The consumption level chosen by the parent generation in
period 2 becomes the reference level of consumption for the child generation. Fur-
ther, the bequest level chosen by the parent is given to the child at the beginning of
period 1. Figure 1.1 summarizes these intergenerational connections. The intergener-
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Figure 1.1: Connections Between Generations
ational persistence in the model comes from the fact that children inherit the reference
consumption directly from their parents. As described below, this has important im-
plications in a model with loss aversion as children will try to avoid consuming below
this reference level due to the much higher marginal disutility of doing so. In contrast,
this is not the case in the model with habit formation as the disutility of consuming
below the reference consumption is only marginally higher as utility is everywhere
concave.
1.2.2 Loss Aversion
The utility function, U(zt), will be allowed to take two main forms. In the version of
the model with habit formation (but no loss aversion), the per period utility will be





Equation (5) is a standard constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function
which is increasing and concave for all levels of zt. In this case, agents will try to
smooth consumption across the two periods. The utility function is represented in
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Figure 1.2: Utility and Marginal Utility with Habit Formation Only
figure 1.2(a) and the marginal utility is in figure 1.2(b).
The more interesting case (at least in this model) is when the utility function
represents loss averse preferences. Loss aversion was first introduced by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) as part of their prospect theory. The key insight represented by
loss aversion is that agents are risk averse when it comes to gains (as in traditional
expected utility theory) but are risk loving when it comes to losses, so that utility
is concave in gains but convex in losses. In addition, the marginal utility of a loss
is around twice as large as the marginal utility of a comparably sized gain. In this
model there is no risk per se (as there is no uncertainty for the agent), so a loss
averse utility function means that agents will avoid losses as much as possible. We
















for zt < 0
(6)
The loss aversion parameter λ was estimated by Kahneman and Tversky to be
around 2.25. A value larger than one means that marginal utility is larger for losses
than for comparably sized gains. Note also that utility is concave in gains but convex
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Figure 1.3: Utility and Marginal Utility for Strongly Loss Averse Preferences
in losses. That is, marginal utility is decreasing away from zero in both directions, so
that just as the marginal utility of a gain decreases as the gain increases, so too does
the marginal disutility decrease as the loss increases.
Neilson (2002) has suggested a nomenclature for loss aversion which divides po-
tential loss averse utility functions into those exhibiting weak and strong loss aver-
sion. With strong loss aversion, marginal utility is everywhere higher for a loss than
for a gain. That is, a loss averse function U(·) is strongly loss averse if U(0) =
0 and U ′(y) ≤ U ′(z) ∀z < 0 < y. In this case, since zt is measured in percentage
terms (and so has a minimum at -1) we can write U ′(−1) ≥ U ′(0)+ where U ′(0)+ is
the marginal utility as zt approaches 0 from the right. A strongly loss averse utility
function is represented in figure 1.3(a) and marginal utility in figure 1.3(b).
For a weakly loss averse utility function the average utility of a gain is smaller
than the average disutility of a loss. Neilson states that U(·) is weakly loss averse if
U(0) = 0 and U(y)/y ≤ U(z)/z ∀z < 0 < y. For a weakly loss averse function it is
possible that the marginal utility of a gain close to zero (where the marginal utility
of a gain is highest) may be higher than the marginal disutility of a large loss. Note
that strong loss aversion implies weak loss aversion, but not the other way around.
Weakly loss averse utility and marginal utility are represented in figure 1.4. Note
that in this case we have U ′(−1) < U ′(0)+, represented by the dashed line in figure
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Figure 1.4: Utility and Marginal Utility for Weakly Loss Averse Preferences
1.4(b).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) adopt a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA or
power) functional form, and many papers that use loss aversion have used this type of
function. However, in a CRRA utility function, marginal utility approaches infinity as
the gain or loss approaches zero. Thus it is impossible for a CRRA loss averse utility
function to exhibit strong loss aversion. A CARA type loss averse function such as
(6) can display either strong or weak loss aversion depending on the relative values
of λ and ν. In this paper, I restrict these values so that utility is always strongly loss
averse (for all zt ≥ −1), as in Bowman et. al (1999). With the CARA-type utility
function in equation (6), this requires that ν < ln(λ).
Because the marginal utility of a loss is always larger than the marginal utility
of a gain, the consumption and saving decision in a deterministic two period model
is fairly straightforward, as Bowman et. al (1999) show. For a given investment in
education, agents will either face a gain in both periods, a loss in both periods, or
a loss in one period and a gain in the other period. Because utility is concave in
gains, agents will smooth gains across the two periods (as much as possible, given
the borrowing constraint). If an agent faces two losses, utility will be maximized by
putting as much of the loss into one period as possible and minimizing the loss in the
next period. The larger loss will, by necessity, be in period 1, the education period,
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due to the borrowing constraint. Finally, if the agent faces a loss in period 1 and a
gain in period 2, she will choose to minimize the loss as much as possible by reducing
the gain in period 2. Eliminating the loss in period 1 may not be possible if the agent
faces a borrowing constraint. More details of the solution are given in section 2.5.
Given that loss aversion has both experimental and empirical support it may seem
odd that it has not been used more in existing literature. However, loss aversion poses
some theoretical problems. Because utility is convex in some areas, in any model with
more than two periods there will be multiple equilibria. An agent who groups all her
losses into one period is indifferent as to which period that is. Furthermore, if the
level of reference consumption is under the control of the agent there can be further
perverse results in which the agent will reduce reference consumption in order to
increase future utility. This point is discussed further in section 2.4. However, if we
are willing to impose further restrictions on the model to rule out such complications,
models with loss aversion may shed light on problems that conventional models cannot
address.
1.2.3 Borrowing Constraint
Borrowing constraints, represented by Ω in equation (1), interact with loss aversion
and habit formation in important ways. Easier credit, or less severe borrowing con-
straints, will allow agents to avoid losses. Tighter borrowing constraints, on the other
hand, make a loss in period one much more likely even if the agent will have a large
gain in period two.
I explore four different degrees of borrowing constraint in this paper. First, there
may be perfect capital markets. In this case there is no period one borrowing con-
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] (lifetime budget constraint only) (7a)
Second, I assume that agents can borrow up to their cost of education (assum-
ing this is less than the lifetime borrowing constraint). In this case the borrowing
constraint becomes:
Ωed = −ε(e) (education cost borrowing constraint) (7b)
In this case, students can borrow the entire direct cost of their education, but
are unable to borrow in order to finance consumption. In some cases this may be a
realistic assumption. Many students do borrow a large portion of the cost of college
and graduate school.
Third, I assume that savings between periods one and two must be non-negative.
In this case, students cannot borrow at all to finance their education. Students must
pay their entire education bill through their bequest, T . Thus we have:
Ωno = 0 (no borrowing allowed between periods) (7c)
In reality the borrowing constraint probably falls somewhere between Ωed and
Ωno for most students. Some education loans require parents to co-sign the loan
2. In
addition, Winter (2009) shows that as many as 18% of households may face borrowing
constraints when financing education. The final borrowing constraint I explore in this
paper is a function of parental income:
2According to the Department of Education (http://federalstudentaid.ed.gov/federalaidfirst/),
while Stafford loans only require a student signature, so-called parent PLUS loans require a credit
check and co-signer as do most private (i.e. not federally subsidized) loans.
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Ωp = f [ω(e−1, ψ−1)] (borrowing constraint based on parent income) (7d)
Where ω(e−1, ψ−1) is the income of the previous generation. In this case, agents
from poorer families will face a more severe borrowing constraint than agents from
richer families. As we will see, this may play a significant role in keeping those who
are born poor from rising substantially in the income distribution.
1.2.4 Bequest Motive
The function B(T ′) in equation (1) gives the utility gained from leaving a bequest of
size T ′. This type of bequest is known as a warm glow bequest because the person
giving the bequest does not take the utility of the person receiving the bequest directly







Because zt is measured in percentage terms, it is useful to scale bequests by the
level of reference consumption. If θ = µ then the agent sets T
′
c0
= z2 when z2 ≥ 0
or T ′ = c2 − c0. In many cases, however, agents will optimally have zero gain in the
second period, in order to minimize losses in period one. An agent consuming at (or
below) the reference level of consumption in period 2 will leave no bequest to the next
generation.
Allowing agents to take into account the utility of the next generation in deciding
on bequest levels, rather than assuming warm glow bequests, would open up a number
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of complicating issues. First, it would require an expansion of the state space to
account for the next generation’s (now known) earning ability. Parents would treat
a child with high earning ability differently than they would treat a child with low
earning ability. This may in fact be the case for parents with multiple children. It
seems less likely (but still possible) in the present model where each parent generation
only has one child in the next generation.
Second, if a parent takes his child’s utility into account when choosing his bequest,
it seems only natural that he should also think of his child’s utility when choosing
consumption in the second period of life. After all, second period consumption in the
parent generation becomes the reference level of consumption for the child generation
(while not, in this model, directly affecting the child’s lifetime utility). A purely
altruistic parent would have an incentive to reduce second period consumption (while
increasing the bequest) so that the child would have higher lifetime utility. Some
parents may indeed reduce consumption on the margin as children are growing up so
as to set more reasonable lifetime expectations, but it seems unrealistic that parents
would choose less safe cars, more dangerous neighborhoods, or lower quality schools
than they can afford.
The assumptions of strong loss aversion, warm glow bequests, and a CARA-type
utility function are necessary to find a unique solution to the model but may drive
many of the model’s results. In order to test these assumptions, I would need to
solve the consumption-saving decision for weak loss aversion. Another reasonable
extension would be to add an Inada-type utility function to the loss aversion function
so that agents never consume zero in the first period. Adding a bequest motive that
takes into account the utility of the child may be impossible, as discussed above, but
changing the warm glow bequest function to match the data on inter-vivos transfers
and end of life bequests may help make the model more accurate. I leave these more
complex modeling assumptions for future work.
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1.2.5 Solution Methodology
As noted above, with loss averse preferences, the utility function is concave in gains
and convex in losses. Given this fact, we cannot use the first order conditions to solve
for the utility-maximizing levels of education, consumption, and bequests. However,
because the model makes the assumption of strong loss aversion, and given that agents
choose consumption for only two periods, we can still solve for how they will divide
a certain level of lifetime resources between periods (as in Bowman et al (1999)).
For a given level of education we can calculate both total lifetime resources and the
maximum consumption in the first period and minimum consumption in the second
period, which will vary depending on the given borrowing constraint. For simplicity,
I assume that β = 1 + r = 1. Letting Rlt(e, ψ) denote lifetime resources, R1max(e, ψ)
denote maximum period one resources and R2min(e, ψ, T
′) denote minimum period two
consumption when period one consumption is maximized we can write:
Rlt(e, ψ) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T + −ε(e) + ω(e, ψ) − T ′ (9a)
R1max(e, ψ) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T − ε(e) − Ω (9b)
R2min(e, ψ, T
′) = ω(e, ψ) + Ω(1 + r) − T ′ (9c)
We need to evaluate a number of possible cases. First, when the agent has a non-
binding borrowing constraint and enough lifetime resources to consume a gain (or at
least avoid a loss) in both periods (i.e. Rlt ≥ 2c0) then the standard conclusion holds
and the agent will smooth consumption across periods so that c1 = c2 = T
′ + c0 ≥ c0.
In this case we have c2 =
Rlt+c0
3
. With the same lifetime resources, but a binding
borrowing constraint, the agent will consume as much as possible in period 1 (which




max ≤? c0 < c2 = T
′ + c0 =
R2min+c0
2
. Note that this is how the agent will
allocate resources for a given education level. Below, I will characterize the level of
education that maximizes utility.
If lifetime resources for a given level of education are not large enough to consume
at or above the reference level of consumption in both periods but are large enough to
consume at reference consumption for one period (c0 < R
lt < 2c0), the agent will put
all losses into period one and consume at reference in period two. Consumption will
then be: 0 ≤ c1 < c0 = c2, T
′ = 0. Under loss aversion, the agent will not optimally
smooth losses between periods because the marginal utility gained in period one will
be lower than the marginal utility lost in period two, given that marginal utility is
decreasing in the size of the loss. Assuming that the agent is strongly loss averse,
he will not increase the loss in period one in order to consume at a gain in period
two because the marginal utility from the loss is always larger than the marginal
utility of any sized gain. Note that in some cases, the same utility could be gained by
consuming at reference consumption in period one and consuming whatever is left in
period two. However, so long as there are borrowing constraints (and β(1 + r) = 1),
it is more likely that consumption in period two will be larger.
If lifetime resources are less than reference consumption (Rlt < c0), agents will
take as large a loss as possible in period one and consume lifetime resources in period
two. That is, c1 = 0 < c2 = R
lt < c0, T
′ = 0. The intuition is the same as the previous
case. Because marginal utility is decreasing in the size of the loss, the agent wants
to minimize one of the losses. Increasing consumption in period one and decreasing
period two consumption would reduce utility because the marginal utility gained in
period one would be smaller than that lost in period two. These consumption and
bequest patterns are summarized in Table 1.
Next, we can write the indirect lifetime utility function associated with each level
of education, based on the consumption and bequest pattern solved for above:
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Table 1.1: Consumption and Bequest Patterns for a Given Level of Resources
Rlt R1max c1 c2 T
′ Description

















lt < 2c0 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c0 c0 0 Concentrate loss in period 1
< c0 0 R
lt 0 Concentrate loss in period 1
W (e, c0, T, ψ) = max
c1,c2,T ′
U(z1) + β[U(z2) +B(T
′)]
The optimal level of education, ê, maximizes this indirect utility function:
ê = argmax
e
W (e, c0, T, ψ) (10)
Subject to the constraints in equation (1).
In my numerical simulations below, I assume the agent has a discrete number of
education choices available, designed to mimic a high school dropout, a high school
graduate, some college/Associate’s degree, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and a
PhD/professional degree. Given the discrete choice set it is easy to find the utility-
maximizing education level by simply comparing total lifetime utility for each educa-
tion level.
In addition, we can calculate e∗, the level of education that maximizes lifetime
resources, in the absence of borrowing constraints:
e∗ = argmax
e
(1 − e)ω(e, ψ) − ε(e) + ω(e, ψ) (11)
The education level e∗equates the cost (both direct and opportunity) of education
with the benefit in terms of wages. No agent will ever choose an education level higher
than e∗. Adding an extra unit of education above e∗ will reduce lifetime resources
and either increase a loss or reduce a gain in one or both periods, and therefore must
reduce utility.
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However, it is possible that the utility-maximizing level of education is less than
the resource-maximizing level (ê ≤ e∗). This is possible because of the presence of
borrowing constraints and loss aversion. Reducing the level of education from e∗
will increase resources available in period one by reducing the direct and opportunity
cost of education. These extra resources can then be used to reduce or eliminate a
loss in the first period even if it means reducing a gain in the second period. For
example, imagine a person who would maximize lifetime resources by receiving a
Master’s degree. In order to do this, she needs to be in school (and, therefore, not
working) for much of period one. If she faces a borrowing constraint, she may well
be forced into consuming at a level less than her reference consumption in period
one. She may be able to consume well above her reference consumption in period two
with her Master’s degree, but she is unable to bring this consumption forward due
to the borrowing constraint. In this case she may optimally choose some lower level
of education, such as a Bachelor’s degree, in order to reduce or eliminate the loss in
period one, even though it will mean reducing the gain in period two due to her now
lower wage in the second period.
For a given borrowing constraint, there are two factors that increase the likelihood
that a person will get less education than the amount that would maximize lifetime
resources. First, those who have higher earning ability (and, therefore a higher e∗)
will be more likely to invest in less education. This is simply because the education
choice set is larger for this group. For someone who maximizes lifetime resources
with a high school diploma, the only other option is dropping out. Second, those who
have a lower reference consumption level will be less likely to invest in the resource-
maximizing level of education. This is because they will find it easier to replace
reference consumption with a lower level of education than someone who has a high
reference level of consumption. Put another way, a person who grows up rich is likely
to have a loss in the first period no matter what. In order to minimize or eliminate
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the loss in the second period, they will need to get the resource maximizing level of
education, e∗. The additional loss in period one from getting the extra education will
be outweighed by reducing the loss in period two.
The numerical solution methodology is straightforward. Given the optimal con-
sumption/saving/bequest pattern conditioned on education, as shown in Table 1, I
calculate the utility-maximizing (as well as the resource-maximizing) level of educa-
tion for each possible state (where the state consists of reference consumption, earning
ability, and bequest). Each education level then implies consumption in each period,
saving/borrowing between periods, and a bequest level for the next generation. I
simulate an economy with N families, each starting with a normally-distributed ran-
domly assigned earning ability, reference consumption, and bequest. I calculate the
education choice, ê, for each person in the initial generation as well as their con-
sumption in each period, savings and bequest. I then assign a random earning ability
level to each of the N agents in the next period and carry over their reference con-
sumption and bequest level from the previous generation. I can then calculate the
correlation of education, wages, consumption, and bequests between generations. I
run the simulation for 100 generations and check to make sure that the distributions
of wages, consumption, and bequests have converged3. I then throw out the first 10%
of generations and use the last 90% to calculate the target moments which I compare
to the data. These simulation results are reported in section four, but first I review
the data that the model is attempting to match.
1.3 Data
Measuring the correlation of income between generations is conceptually straightfor-
ward. However, there are two main problems for the empirical economist to overcome.
3For wages, for example, I add up the wages in each decile and then take the norm of the difference
between generations. For convergence, I require this to be less than some number ε.
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First, most data sets do not span a long enough time frame to include income from
more than one generation. Second, those data sets that do have a long time span,
such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), usually don’t have a lot of years
of income for both generations. Studies that used only a limited number of years for
either or both generations are prone to measurement error because they are likely
to be measuring transitory income rather than permanent income (see Bowles et al
(2005) for a discussion of the literature).
Early measurements of the correlation of income between generations based on a
small number of years of income data for each generation were typically no higher than
0.2. Becker and Tomes (1986), for example, report an average of 0.15. With such a low
correlation, any advantage that one family has over another will almost completely
disappear after only two generations. Becker and Tomes use these estimates to dismiss
the idea that economic success or failure is passed along from one generation to
another along with green eyes or curly hair.
More recent studies based on more years of data for at least the parent’s gener-
ation, however, overturn this conclusion fairly convincingly, finding intergenerational
income correlations of at least 0.4. A large data set put together by Mazumder (2005)
uses Social Security Administration data in the U.S., matched with the 1984 Survey
of Income and Program Participation, which allows him to use up to 16 years of a
father’s income and four years of the child’s income. He finds that the estimated
intergenerational income correlation increases as the number of years of income for
the father increases. The correlation is less than 0.3 using only two years of father’s
income but climbs as high as 0.6 when using 16 years of father’s income. The latter
average is a better proxy for lifetime income as it smooths out the bumps from tran-
sitory shocks. A correlation of income of 0.6, as Mazumder notes, has significantly
different implications than one of 0.2 or even 0.4, as it implies that the descendants
of someone at 200% or 25% of the mean income will not be within 5% of the average
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until after six generations.
Mulligan (1997) uses the PSID to measure the intergenerational correlation of
a number of relevant factors using an instrumental variable approach to overcome
measurement error. A regression of child wages on parent’s wages yields an estimated
coefficient of between 0.32 (OLS) and 0.53 (IV). Family income has a coefficient
between generations of between 0.47 (OLS) and 0.71 (IV), while family consumption
has a coefficient of between 0.54 (OLS) and 0.77 (IV)4. It is interesting to note that
parental consumption appears to be more correlated with children’s outcomes than is
parental income or wages. This fact may support a model such as the one presented
in this paper in which agents have (at least) habit formation and possibly loss-averse
preferences. Alternatively, it may be capturing consumption smoothing given that
measured annual income is fairly noisy so that consumption may be a better measure
of permanent income than income itself.
While most studies of intergenerational persistence use linear regressions, a hand-
ful take a nonlinear approach. Hertz (2005) constructs transition matrices from
parental income deciles to child’s deciles using the PSID. Adjusting income for age,
he finds that a child with a parent in the bottom income decile has a 31.5% chance
of staying in that bottom decile and over a 50 percent chance of being in the bottom
quintile. On the other extreme, a child with a parent in the top income decile has a
29.6% chance of staying in that top decile and a 43.3% chance of remaining in the
top quintile.
In this paper, I will focus on four key intergenerational income transition rates.
The poverty trap measures how likely it is for children born in the bottom quintile of
the income distribution to stay there as adults while the affluence net measures how
likely children born in the top quintile will stay there. The jump up rate measures
4In Mulligan’s instrumental variable regressions he uses family income as an instrument for family
consumption which is measured with a lot of noise, as well as using instruments such as occupation
and school categories as instruments for lifetime parental income.
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how often children born in the bottom quintile are able to jump up to the top quintile
of the income distribution, while the fall down rate measures how many children from
the affluent top quintile fall down to the bottom quintile.
Interestingly, the transition matrices are quite different for white and black fam-
ilies. Mazumder (2008) calculates transition probabilities from each income quintile
by race, using the NLSY79 data set. He finds similar transition numbers as Hertz
for white families. Using income quintiles, he finds a poverty trap of only 24.9% for
white families (where we would expect it to be 20% with perfect mobility) and an
affluence net of 38.9%. Comparable numbers in Hertz are 27.2% and 38.5%, respec-
tively. For black families, Mazumder finds a poverty trap of 43.7%, and an affluence
net of 21.3%. An affluence net of around 20% is, in fact, no net at all as it is the
value we would expect if outcomes were completely random between generations. In
both Hertz (2005) and Mazumder (2008), the black and white income quintiles are
calculated using the entire population, rather than a subset of only white workers or
only black workers. In the simulations reported below I calculate income quintiles
in the same manner so as to be better able to compare the model’s results with the
data.
These matrices also allow us to measure the likelihood of extreme movements in the
income distribution between generations. First, how many rags-to-riches stories are
there? That is, how many children born in the bottom quintile rise to the top quintile?
Mazumder (2008), using the NLSY79, finds that 10.6% of poor white children make
the jump to the top compared to only 4.1% of poor black children. Second, how many
children fall through the affluence net and go from the top quintile to the bottom?
Mazumder finds that 10.4% of white children suffer this reversal of fortune, while
21.6% of black children born into the top quintile fall to the bottom. Because of
the significant differences by race, in my numerical calibrations I focus on matching
the distribution of white families and leave possible theoretical explanations for why
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Table 1.2: Wage Correlation and Quintile Transition Rates in a Linear Model
Data* Linear Simulations
White Black ρω = 0 ρω = 0.2 ρω = 0.4 ρω = 0.6
Correlation of Wages 0.00 0.19 0.41 0.60
Poverty Trap 24.9% 43.7% 20.4% 28.2% 37.7% 49.5%
Affluence Net 38.9% 21.3% 19.8% 27.8% 37.6% 49.2%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 18.7% 13.2% 6.7% 2.2%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 19.8% 14.2% 6.8% 2.4%
* Source for data is Mazumder (2008).
black family transition rates are so different to future work.
Asymmetries between the poverty trap and affluence net and between the jump
up rate and the fall down rate cannot be explained in a simple linear model. Imagine
that wages are random but that there is some level of correlation, ρω, between the
generations:
ωi = ρωωi−1 + (1 − ρω)ω̄ + ε
ε ∼ N(0, (1 − ρ2ω)σ
2
ε )
Where ωi is the wage of the child and ωi−1 is the wage of the parent. It is easy to
simulate such a model and generate the implied correlation of income as well as the
various transition rates. These are presented in Table 1.2. As you can see, transition
rates are symmetric for a given level of ρω. When there is no correlation between
the generations, all transition rates (measured in quintiles) are around 20% as we
would expect. When the correlation is 0.2, both the poverty trap and the affluence
net (measured in quintiles) are around 28% while the jump up and fall down rates
are around 13.5%. At a correlation level of 0.6, the poverty trap and affluence net
are both almost 50% while the jump up and fall down rates are only around 2%.
Compared to these symmetric benchmarks, the data show significant asymmetries
such as a larger affluence net for whites and a larger poverty trap for blacks.
Mulligan (1997) also presents data on the intergenerational persistence of edu-
cation. This is important because education is an important factor in determining
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wages. He finds that the coefficient on parent’s education in a regression of child’s
education is somewhere between 0.19 and 0.45, with an average estimate of 0.29.
With a number around 0.3, Mulligan notes that education will regress towards the
mean fairly rapidly. However, the distribution of education has changed significantly
over the last few generations. In the last sixty years, we have gone from a world in
which only the elite attended college and many never finished high school, to a world
in which most people get at least some post-secondary education and more than ten
percent get some form of graduate degrees. If the variance of the education distribu-
tion has increased as the mean has increased, the measured correlation of education
will be depressed.
The distribution of income by education level is well documented in the United
States. Using data from the Current Population Survey, the ratio of overall mean
wages to the mean wage of a high school graduate is 1.40. High school dropouts have
a median wage that is 71% that of a high school graduate. Those with some college
have a median wage 19% higher while those with a BA have annual earnings 60%
higher than those with a high school diploma. Wage premia increase as we move up
the education ladder. Those with a Master’s degree make 180% more at the median
than a high school graduate and those with a PhD or professional degree earn over
two and a half times as much.
Given the very high return to education, it is perhaps surprising that so few
people receive graduate degrees. In the United States only 9.4% of 35 to 44 year olds
have received a Master’s degree and only 3.5% have a professional degree or PhD.
On the other side of the distribution, 8.8% do not have a high school degree (which
is surprisingly high given that there is no direct cost for most people to finish high
school). In this age range, 27.6% have only a high school degree, about the same have
some college or an Associate’s degree, and 22.9% have a Bachelor’s degree.
Census data also indicate that the variance of annual earnings increases along with
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Figure 1.5: Income Distribution by Education
Table 1.3: Median Income and Standard Deviations by Education Level (White Full-
Time Workers)
Education Level Median Wage (HS = 1) Standard Deviation (est)
HS Dropout 0.71 0.43
High School Grad 1.00 0.52
Some College/Assoc. Degree 1.19 0.61
Bachelor’s Degree 1.60 0.87
Master’s Degree 1.80 1.01
Prof. Degree/PhD 2.71 1.62
Source: Census, CPS 2008 Annual Social and Economic Supplement
the mean as the amount of education increases. From Figure 1.5, most high school
dropouts fall in a fairly narrow band of annual earnings. High school graduates have
a wider distribution of earnings while those at the top of the education distribution
have a very wide range of annual earnings. For example, almost 80% of high school
dropouts earn between $20,000 and $50,000 in a year. The 90-10 range widens to
$30,000 to $110,000 for those with a BA and to approximately $40,000 to $210,000
for those with a professional degree or a PhD. Median income and standard deviations
by education level are reported in Table 1.3.
Thus, while education is clearly correlated with earnings, it has widely disparate
effects on different types of workers. One possible explanation is that the available
data does not measure the quality of education. The quality of a bachelor’s degree
from one institution may be much inferior to that from a different institution. How-
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ever, studies that measure and correct for quality (e.g. Harmon and Walker 2000) still
find that people with the same level of education have very different outcomes, sug-
gesting that luck, effort, and/or inherent differences are also important determinants
of wages.
The recent literature using quantile regressions (see, for example, Lemieux 2006)
shows that the return to education differs (sometimes substantially) by wage per-
centile. Those at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution (by education) have
much larger returns to education than do those at the 10th percentile. Interestingly,
Lemieux shows that the increase in inequality over the last 30 years is mainly due
to an increase in the return to education, especially at the higher percentiles. The
relevant question for this paper is how much of that economic success at the higher
quantiles will be passed along to the next generation.
There is some evidence (Blanden and Gregg, 2004, Corak et al 2004) that hold-
ing all else equal, children from families with higher income tend to receive more
and higher-quality education. Shea (2000), on the other hand, finds only a minimal
relationship between family income and child education. Below, I present my own
findings that there is a quadratic relationship between family income and education,
perhaps obscuring the relationship for those looking only for a linear coefficient.
1.4 Calibration Results
1.4.1 Parameter Values and Calibration Targets
This section presents numerical results from simulations of the model, comparing the
model with loss aversion to that with habit formation but with utility that is concave
everywhere. Table 4 presents parameter values that are common to both versions of
the model. Most values should not be controversial. I use a CARA parameter of 0.01
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Table 1.4: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description Source/Explanation
λ 2.25 Loss aversion parameter Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
β = R = (1 + r) 1 Rate of time preference & interest rate Simplicity
φ1 0.0 Linear term in cost of education Estimated from Dept. of Education,
φ2 0.3 Quadratic term in cost of education National Ctr for Education Statistics
e, ψ [0,1] Range for education and earning ability Normalization
ψ̄ 0.5 Average ability level
σψ 0.15 Standard deviation of earning ability, ψ 3 st. dev. above & below the mean
for gains. I use Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) value for the loss aversion parameter,
λ, of 2.25. Other estimates of this parameter in the literature generally find it to be
between 2 and 3. Given that strong loss aversion requires that the CARA parameter
for losses, ν, be less than ln(λ), I let ν be the maximum value of ln(λ) ≈ 0.8. Because
there are only two periods, I allow both β and the gross interest rate R to equal one.
This is done without loss of generality so long as we make the standard assumption
that βR = 1. In order to estimate the direct education costs, I use the Department
of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, then normalize against the
median income of a high school graduate, assuming each period is approximately 20
years. I set the direct cost of the first two levels of education, equivalent to a high
school dropout and high school graduate, at zero, as most students in the United
States have access to free education through the twelfth grade. The data is graphed
in Figure 1.6, showing that education costs tend to be convex. Finally, I choose the
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of earning ability, ψ (which is assumed
to be normally distributed), so that the population includes agents with earning
ability levels that are up to three standard deviations above and below the mean.
I calibrate the wage function (2) to match features of the education distribution
and income distribution by education level for white full-time workers. I focus on
white workers in this paper because of the disparate outcomes experienced by white
and black families in the intergenerational transmission of income, discussed in sec-
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Figure 1.6: Range of Education Costs
* Graphs a range of public education costs assuming a free public high school educa-
tion, two years of community college, two years at a public in-state college, and
four years of various types of professional graduate school. Data from U.S. De-
partment of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 1987-88 through
2007-08 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, "Fall Enrollment Survey"
(IPEDS-EF:87-99); "Completions Survey" (IPEDS-C:88-99); "Institutional Charac-
teristics Survey" (IPEDS-IC:87-99).
tion 3. Malloy (2010) discusses possible explanations of these disparate outcomes. I
divide education into six possible levels ranging evenly from 0 to 1. I set the wage
parameters, α1, α2, ζ, and κ from equation (2) so that the model matches the ob-
served median income by education level and the education distribution as closely as
possible5. Because the minimum of both education, e, and earning ability, ψ, is set
at zero, the minimum possible wage in the model, given the semi-log wage function
represented by equation (2), is 1. The maximum possible wage occurs when both
education and earning ability are at their maximum. Because behavior is signifi-
cantly different for loss averse agents as opposed to those with habit-formation-only
preferences, I calibrate the model separately for these two utility functions. For the
baseline calibration, I allow agents to borrow the entire cost of their education so
that Ω = −ε(e). The observed targets and corresponding moments implied by the
calibrated models are presented in Table 1.5.
5I use a simple Euclidean norm of the difference between target and calibrated moments of the
12 target moments and search over a grid that varies by values of 0.005.
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Table 1.5: Target and Calibrated Moments
Moment Target Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only
Education Distribution
High School Dropouts 7.9% 8.8% 8.7%
High School Grads 28.5% 23.8% 29.1%
Some College/Assoc. Degree 27.8% 27.5% 24.4%
Bachelor’s Degree 23.1% 31.0% 25.3%
Master’s Degree 9.2% 7.2% 11.1%
Prof. Degrees/PhD 3.5% 1.9% 1.4%
Median Income by Education Level
High School Dropout Wage 0.71 0.78 0.77
High School Grad Wage 1.00 1.00 1.00
Some College/Assoc. Degree Wage 1.19 1.57 1.37
Bachelor’s Degree Wage 1.60 1.65 1.85
Master’s Degree Wage 1.80 2.10 2.75
Prof. Degrees/PhD Wage 2.71 4.04 4.57
Despite the fact that the model is under identified, both models do a fairly good
job of matching the targeted moments. They suffer at the extremes as neither is able
to generate a large enough percentage of the population investing in the top level of
education despite wages that are higher than in the data. This is likely due to the
assumption that investing in a professional/PhD in the education period consumes
all of the agent’s time so that they are unable to earn anything in the first period.
I report the calibrated parameters from equation (2) in Table 1.6. In order to
determine whether or not these are reasonable values, I also present the minimum,
average, and maximum return to the equivalent of one year of education and the ratio
of the maximum wage to the minimum. The return to education averages 8.4% in the
loss-averse model and 7.3% in the habit-formation-only model. The labor literature
generally finds a value between five and ten percent, so these values seem reasonable.
1.4.2 Education Decision Rules
Based on (11), the resource maximizing level of education, e∗, will depend only on an
agent’s earning ability. An individual’s wage is completely determined by his level of
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Table 1.6: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only
α1: linear term on education 0.285 0.250
α2: quadratic term on education 0.190 0.000
ζ: interaction term (education*ability) 0.655 0.900
κ: linear term on ability 1.450 1.200
Minimum marginal return to education 3.1% 2.5%
Average marginal return to education 8.4% 7.3%
Maximum marginal return to education 13.9% 12.2%
Max-Min Wage Ratio 13.2 10.5
education and earning ability, while the cost of education (both direct and opportu-
nity) depends only on the level of education chosen. Figure 1.7 graphs the normal
distribution of earning ability and the corresponding level of education that would
maximize lifetime resources for each model. As expected, e∗ is a monotonically in-
creasing function of earning ability. Those with the lowest earning ability maximize
resources by choosing the minimum of education because the cost of acquiring more
would outweigh the benefit of a higher wage in the second period. Those with the
highest earning ability would maximize lifetime resources by investing in the maxi-
mum level of education. Note that in this figure the differences between the e∗implied
by the loss aversion and habit formation models are due solely to differences in the
calibrated parameter values for the wage function shown in table 1.6.
The actual education level chosen to maximize lifetime utility, ê, may be less than
or equal to e∗ (as discussed earlier, it will never be more than e∗). Figure 1.8 graphs
the decision rule for ê, (as a function of reference consumption) for a loss-averse
agent with an ability level approximately one standard deviation above the mean,
for different levels of bequest. For this individual, the level of education that would
maximize lifetime resources is e∗ = 1, the maximum level of education. However, those
with little or no bequest from the previous generation and an intermediate reference
consumption level will optimally choose a lower, and sometimes substantially lower,
level of education. Intuitively, agents with a moderate reference level of consumption
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Figure 1.7: Earnings Ability and Resource Maximizing Education
can more easily replace it with a lower level of education, thus avoiding a loss in period
1. Choosing a level of education less than e∗ allows them to minimize or eliminate
the loss in period one. Overall lifetime utility will be increased, even if choosing
ê < 1 means a lower (or non-existent) gain in period two. This shows one mechanism
in the model that transmits earnings from one generation to the next: those with
lower family consumption choose lower education, and therefore have lower earnings
themselves.
As reference consumption increases, the likelihood of a loss in the first period
increases (until it is equal to 1). At very high levels of reference consumption, agents
cannot avoid losses in period 1 and can only hope to eliminate or reduce losses in
period 2. In order to decrease or eliminate the loss in period two, they will maximize
second period income by investing in the resource-maximizing level of education,
e∗. Thus, those with higher reference (or childhood) consumption will have higher
earnings than those individuals with moderate reference consumption, because utility
maximization forces them to invest in the highest level of education.
Note that those with the lowest reference consumption will invest in higher levels of
education than those directly to their right in the reference consumption distribution.
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Figure 1.8: Utility Maximizing Education by Reference Consumption and Bequest
Received for Loss-Averse Agent
This is because with very low levels of reference consumption it is easier to avoid a loss
in the first period, even when getting more education. The dashed line at c0 = 2 is
the equilibrium minimum reference consumption for agents in the model simulation.
To the left of this line agents would invest in more education, but agents never visit
this region of the state space in equilibrium.
Figure 1.9 gives the education investment decision under habit-formation-only
preferences. When agents can borrow to finance the direct cost of education, ε(e), as
in the benchmark model, the decision rule is simply a horizontal line at e∗, which for
this agent is equal to 0.6. If there is a more severe borrowing constraint, education
will be upward sloping in c0, as represented by the dashed line, until the constraint
no longer binds and the agent can invest in the optimal level of education. The
U-shaped education investment decision for loss averse agents and the contrasting
flat or upward sloping investment-decision rule for habit-formation-only agents is the
main testable implication of the model. In the next section I present evidence which
provides support for loss averse preferences.
The final thing to note from Figure 1.8 is that the agent will invest more in
39
education as her bequest increases. In this model, bequests allow agents to avoid
or minimize losses in period one. And because utility is standard (i.e. concave and
monotonic) in gains, agents will be more likely to invest in the amount of education
that will maximize lifetime resources, as in a standard model.
An important implication of Figure 1.8 is that some people will get less education
than would maximize lifetime resources. That is, because of their loss averse prefer-
ences and the (mild) borrowing constraint, they fail to equate the marginal benefit of
an extra year of education with its marginal cost. In the simulation of the loss averse
model, about half of the agents invest in less education than would maximize lifetime
resources (i.e. ê < e∗). For those who do invest in a lower level of education, the
average gap (e∗− ê) is a bit more than 0.4, or about two levels of education. That is,
agents who should invest in the maximum level of education, such as a professional
degree, on average would invest in only a college degree.
Because this is not a general equilibrium model, it would be inappropriate to
measure the possible output and welfare gains that would result from the government
solving the imperfect capital markets problem in the model. However, one can make
informed speculations. In the model, more education increases productivity. It does
this more for some people than for others. If someone with high aptitude becomes an
electrical engineer rather than an electrician, or a doctor instead of a nurse, she will
be much more productive. Society benefits in because such individuals are producing
more output than they would otherwise have done.
1.4.3 Correlations Across Generations
The intergenerational correlation of income depends on a number of mechanisms in
the model. As discussed above, loss aversion contributes to a positive correlation for
two reasons. First, those with moderately low parental income (and thus reference
consumption) have an incentive to invest less in education in order to avoid losses in
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Figure 1.9: Utility Maximizing Education by Reference Consumption and Bequest
Received for Habit-Formation-Only Agent
the first period of life even though this will reduce gains in the second period due to
their lower wage. Second, those with higher reference consumption are likely to be
faced with a loss in period one no matter what level of education they choose. In
order to avoid or minimize a loss in period two, they will invest in more education
in period one and raise their wage and consumption in period two. Thus, the same
factors that contribute to a correlation of earnings across generations are also likely
to contribute to a positive correlation of education.
Table 1.7 lists intergenerational correlations for wages, education, consumption,
and bequests. The data for the correlation of income comes from Mazumder (2005)
while the correlation of education and consumption comes from Mulligan (1997). I
present results for both types of utility function as well as three different borrowing
constraints. When there is no borrowing constraint (columns (1) and (4)), all agents
choose the resource-maximizing education level for both models, and because earning
ability is independent across generations, there is no correlation of either income
or education. With a borrowing constraint in which agents are able to borrow the
full direct cost of education (columns (2) and (5)), the loss averse model is able
to generate a correlation of income of 0.14 and a correlation of education of 0.24,
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Table 1.7: Intergenerational Correlations
Data Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No BC Ω = ε(e) Ω = f(c0) No BC Ω = ε(e) Ω = f(c0)
Income 0.60 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.00 -0.00 0.14
Education 0.29 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.00 -0.01 0.26
Consumption (total) 0.68 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.32 0.36 0.36
Consumption (period 2) 0.79 0.76 0.80 0.33 0.32 0.39
Bequests NA -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.18 -0.10
while the habit-formation-only model still exhibits roughly zero correlation of both
income and education. Finally, I present results when the borrowing constraint is a
function of reference consumption, Ω = f(c0). For simplicity, I assume that those with
reference consumption in the bottom twenty percent do not have access to financial
markets and so cannot borrow at all while everybody else can borrow the direct cost
of education. In this case, habit-formation is able to generate a positive correlation
of income.
As discussed in the introduction, most students do have access to both loans and
grants that can cover most, if not all, of the tuition at a public, in-state, four-year
college. Yet only the model with loss aversion is able to generate a positive and
significant correlation of income when agents are able to borrow the full direct cost
of education.
It is interesting to note that bequests are negatively correlated across generations.
This is true for both models, although less so for loss aversion. Most parents do
not leave a bequest in the loss-averse model, while the median parent leaves a small
bequest in the habit formation only model. The intuition for this negative correlation
is straightforward. A person with a high wage who grew up with a low reference
level of consumption (and therefore probably received no bequest) will be able to
consume above her reference consumption in period two and leave a bequest for
the next generation. The child in the next generation, however, on average would
only have average earning ability and would therefore find it difficult to replace his
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reference consumption in period two. If his consumption in period two is at or below
his reference consumption he will leave no bequest for his child. So while bequests
do play a role in increasing the intergenerational earnings correlation by making it
easier for those with higher reference consumption to invest in the optimal level of
education, this factor typically does not operate across more than one generation.
Consumption is correlated across generations in both versions of the model albeit
in different ways. Because utility is measured in reference to the consumption level of
the individual’s parents, both models generate a correlation of consumption. However,
in the model with only habit formation, because utility is everywhere concave so that
marginal utility is only slightly higher for a loss than for a gain, agents try to smooth
consumption as much as possibly between period 1 and period 2. This leads to a
correlation of consumption that is approximately the same in period two as in total
(period 1 plus period 2). In the model with loss aversion, however, the marginal
utility is higher for a loss than for a gain and is decreasing in the size of the loss.
An agent facing an unavoidable loss will lump the loss in period 1 so as to reduce or
eliminate the loss in period 2. This leads to a much higher correlation of consumption
in period 2 than in total (or in period 1).
The model with loss aversion generates a positive intergenerational correlation
of income primarily because rich kids tend to stay rich. In other words, the model
generates an affluence net. Table 1.8 presents the transition probabilities in the data
and in models under various assumptions on preferences and borrowing constraints.
When there are no borrowing constraints (columns (1) and (3)), most transition
probabilities are close to 20%, indicating no poverty trap or affluence net. The model
with loss aversion and the mild borrowing constraint (column 2) has an affluence
net, in which the children of those in the top quintile stay in the top quintile, of
46.4% while the affluence net with a more severe borrowing constraint (column 3) is
42.0%. The highest affluence net in the habit formation model is 30.2%, in the model
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Table 1.8: Intergenerational Mobility
Data* Simulations
Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White Families No BC Ω = ε(e) Ω = f(c0) No BC Ω = ε(e) Ω = f(c0)
Corr. of Income 0.001 0.142 0.171 0.000 -0.001 0.144
Poverty Trap 24.9% 23.4% 22.6% 23.5% 22.8% 23.4% 23.6%
Affluence Net 38.9% 23.4% 46.4% 42.0% 23.2% 23.2% 30.2%
Jump Up 10.6% 23.3% 12.7% 11.8% 23.2% 23.7% 5.8%
Fall Down 10.4% 22.9% 23.6% 23.2% 23.4% 23.7% 22.8%
* Source: Mazumder (2008)
with severe borrowing constraints. None of the versions of the model are generate
a significant poverty trap in which the children of the poor stay poor, matching
the data of white families in the United States. Both the loss-aversion model, with
mild borrowing constraints, and the habit-formation-only model, with more severe
borrowing constraints, have a significant affluence net. The loss aversion model with
both mild and severe borrowing constraints does a good job of matching the jump up
rate (12.7% and 11.8% vs. 10.6% in the data), but neither model can generate the
low fall down rate observed in the data.
It is interesting that none of the specifications generate a significant poverty trap.
In the model, as in the real world, agents are able to finish high school with no
direct cost and can attend community college at little direct cost. For many, a high
school degree is enough to pull them out of the bottom quintile so that it is easy,
in the model, to escape the poverty trap. In order to generate a significant poverty
trap in this model, earning ability has to be correlated across generations. As an
exercise, Table 1.9 presents the value of ρ, the correlation between parent and child
earning ability, that would be required to generate a correlation of income of 0.45.
The intergenerational persistence level found in white families by Hertz (2003) is 0.32
compared to 0.4 for all families. Unfortunately, Mazumder (2005) does not break
out the correlation of income for white and black families separately. So while the
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Table 1.9: Generating a Higher Correlation of Income Between Generations
Data Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White Families Ω = ε(e) Ω = f(c0) Ω = ε(e) Ω = f(c0)
ρ: Persistence of Ability ? 0.34 0.32 0.46 0.38
Correlation of Income Target = 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Correlation of Education 0.23 0.40 0.47 0.43 0.47
Correlation of Consumption 0.68 0.85 0.87 0.63 0.57
Poverty Trap 24.9% 38.5% 37.5% 44.7% 41.0%
Affluence Net 38.9% 61.3% 56.5% 45.0% 40.6%
Jump Up 10.6% 3.5% 5.7% 7.0% 1.7%
Fall Down 10.4% 13.7% 14.1% 7.0% 9.0%
Source for data: Mazumder (2008), Mulligan (1997)
target of 0.45 for white families is somewhat arbitrary, it is consistent with an overall
correlation of intergenerational income of approximately 0.6.
All four versions of the model reported in Table 1.9 have trouble matching some
key moments. The correlation of education in the data may be low due to the long-
run shift from a population that is mainly high school educated to one that is mainly
college educated, especially if the variance of education is also increasing. There are
no such caveats when looking at the main measures of transition between income
quintiles. All four versions of the model generate a poverty trap and an affluence
net that are too large when ρ is calibrated to match an overall correlation of 0.45.
The model that comes closest to matching the target moments is the one with loss
averse preferences and the more severe borrowing constraint. However these values
are actually farther from the data than the loss averse model with milder borrowing
constraints in which earning ability is completely independent across generations,
listed in column 2 in Table 1.8.
Relative to models with no persistence in ability, the models in Table 1.9 have
smaller percentages of children who jump up from the bottom quintile to the top
and who fall down from the top to the bottom. In fact, the jump up percentage
is now much smaller than the 11.0% observed in the data, even when children are
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able to borrow the entire cost of education. Again, the model with loss aversion and
independent earning ability in Table 8 comes much closer to matching the data with
a jump up rate of 12.7%, although that model generates a fall down rate that is too
high, at around 20%. The models in Table 1.9 come closer to matching the fall down
rate in the data of 6.4% for white families. The model with habit formation and mild
borrowing constraints has a fall down rate of 7.0%. However, all four models in Table
1.9 have a higher fall down rate than jump up rate, the reverse of what is found in
the data.
Taking the results in Table 1.9 as a whole, there is little to recommend the models
with persistence in ability over those in Table 1.8 in which earning ability is indepen-
dent across generations. The models with persistent ability do a better job matching
the overall correlation of income, by construction, and the fall down rate. But they
generate too little mobility in the bottom and top quintiles, with poverty traps and
affluence nets that are much too high. Assuming positive correlation of earning ability
between generations means that those who are in the bottom of the income distri-
bution, and who have low earning ability, are more likely to have children who are
also of low ability. These children will choose low education and therefore also have a
lower income. The same holds for children born at the top of the income distribution
only in reverse. Loss aversion actually magnifies this result, especially at the top as
is shown by the larger affluence nets in columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.9 as opposed to
columns 3 and 4.
As noted in section 3, the variance of income increases with the level of education in
the data. There are a number of possible explanations for this, including unobserved
heterogeneity in the fields of education (e.g. engineering vs. art history), a magnified
effect of luck or effort on those with higher education, or greater heterogeneity in
terms of earning ability at higher levels of education than among those who drop out
of or only graduate from high school. This last possible explanation can be tested and
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Table 1.10: Mean and Standard Deviation of Income by Education Level (Mean HS
Grad = 1)
Data Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Drop Out 0.729 0.433 0.617 0.059 0.735 0.049
High School Grad 1.000 0.520 1.000 0.225 1.000 0.058
Some College/Assoc. Degree 1.186 0.606 1.303 0.279 1.346 0.053
Bachelor’s Degree 1.758 0.866 1.447 0.315 1.855 0.111
Master’s Degree 2.022 1.011 1.793 0.248 2.776 0.222
Professional Degree/PhD 3.105 1.617 3.342 0.724 4.555 0.428
results are presented in the next section. Table 1.10 presents mean income and the
standard deviation of income by education level for the models in which agents can
borrow the full cost of education. While neither the loss averse nor habit-formation-
only model can generate as much variance as the data, given that there is no luck or
uncertainty in the model, the loss-averse model generates significantly more variance
than the habit-formation-only model. This is because agents with a wide range of
ability levels decide to invest in higher levels of education in the loss-averse model,
due to the need to avoid losses in the second period.
1.5 Empirical Tests
As noted in section 4, one important difference between the model with loss aversion
model and the model with habit formation and concave preferences is the shape of the
education decision rule. With loss aversion, the decision rule is U-shaped in reference
(or family) consumption. In the model with concave habit formation, education is
either flat or upward sloping in reference consumption, depending on the borrowing
constraints. I test these implications using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), specifically the NLSY79, which began in 1979 and initially surveyed young
adults between the ages of 17 and 21; and the NLSY97, which began in 1997 and first
surveyed the young respondents between the ages of 12 and 17. Both versions collect
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data on family income, education levels of parents, and the highest level of education
completed.
I use the NLSY rather than the PSID because the former includes a (noisy) mea-
sure of ability. Controlling for ability is important for estimating the education deci-
sion rule. As is shown in figure 6, the maximum level of education, e∗, that an agent
will choose is dependent on her inherent earning ability, ψ. Each NLSY79 respon-
dent took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) in 1980 when
they were between the ages of 18 and 22. The ASVAB is a multiple choice test that
measures both reading and quantitative ability as well as vocational information such
as mechanical knowledge and shop skills. Each person who takes the test is given
an Armed Forces Qualification Test score, which is based only on the arithmetical
reasoning, mathematical knowledge, word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension
section. This score ranges from 0 to 99, representing percentiles. The NLSY97 co-
hort, meanwhile, was given the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT). Most
took the test in 1997 when they were between the ages of 12 and 17. The PIAT con-
sists of six subtests, covering such areas as reading recognition and comprehension
and mathematics. The test was designed to help diagnose learning disabilities rather
than to evaluate new recruits and may do a better job of measuring inherent ability,
at least in the areas it tests. Furthermore, the test was given when respondents were,
on average, five and a half years younger than the older group taking the ASVAB.
It is more likely, therefore, that the NLSY97 test scores measure the inherent ability
of the respondents rather than measuring the quantity and quality of education they
had already received. PIAT results are also reported in percentile scores, ranging
from 0 to 99. Table 1.11 reports summary statistics on test scores and other variables
in the NLSY79 and NLSY97.
The major drawback of the NLSY data sets, as opposed to the PSID, is that they
do not measure consumption. Using the NLSY, I am forced to use total parental
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Table 1.11: Summary Statistics for NLSY79 and NLSY97 Data Set
NLSY79 NLSY97
Variable # Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max # Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
R’s Highest Grade 7,599 13.31 2.43 7 20 8,853 12.98 2.62 7 20
Family Income (log) 5,422 9.73 0.79 4.64 11.55 7,474 9.89 1.077 1.14 12.47
AFQT 11,878 40.95 28.75 1 99
PIAT 6,044 70.32 17.39 0 100
Mother’s Educ (bio) 11,452 11.21 2.67 4 20 8,255 12.48 2.83 3 20
Father’s Educ (bio) 10,531 11.28 3.51 3 20 7,100 12.59 3.17 3 20
Mother’s Educ (res) 7,974 12.57 2.88 3 20
Father’s Educ (res) 5,691 12.90 3.26 3 20
Black 25.0% 25.99%
Hispanic 15.8% 21.16%
income as a proxy for reference consumption. While this does not seem unreasonable,
it will bias the estimated decision rule to the extent that family consumption is
different than income. I use the average family income for the respondent before his
eighteenth birthday. For the early cohort, the NLSY79, this reduces the number of
observations significantly, as I have at most two years of family income (age 17 and
18), while I have no data for those who were over 18 at the start of the survey. The
newer NLSY97 has at least two years of family income data for all respondents (those
who were 17 at the start) and a maximum of seven years for those who were 12. I
convert nominal income in the data to real using the CPI deflator from the BLS. The
main weakness of the NLSY97 data set is that respondents were only between the
ages of 22 and 27 during the last available wave of interviews in 2007 and so may
not be done with their educational investment. Respondents to the NLSY79 were in
their mid-forties at the last interview and so had most likely completed all of their
education.
Regression results are reported in Table 1.12. The dependent variable is the
highest grade completed, measured in total years of education. For example a high
school graduate would have twelve years while a respondent with a BA would have
16 years. The main explanatory variables are the natural log of family income and its
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square. Custom sample weights provided by the NLSY were used in all regressions.
Columns 1 and 4 provide support for a quadratic education decision rule in both the
NLSY79 and NLSY97 data sets when controlling only for race and sex. The linear
term in average family income is negative while the quadratic term is positive. Both
are significant at 1% for both data sets. The theoretical model implies that one should
control for ability as well. The results presented in columns 2 and 5 control for ability,
using the AFQT score for the NLSY79 cohort and the PIAT score for the NLSY97
group. As expected, the coefficient on ability is positive (not shown) and significant
at 1%. The coefficients on both linear and quadratic family income continue to have
the sign implied by the loss aversion model and are still significant at 1%.
While the model does not imply the need to control for parental education levels,
there could be a number of reasons to expect that parental education may have a
positive correlation with child education, even when controlling for the child’s ability
level. For example, it could be that the taste for education is passed down from
parent to child. It could be that more highly educated parents value education more
and so encourage their children to continue their education. Finally, it may be that
more highly educated parents pass on skills that allow their children to more easily
continue on to higher levels of education themselves. Column 2 shows that when the
additional controls of parent education (both mother and father) are introduced for
the NLSY79 regression, the coefficients on family income and its square still have
the correct signs, but are no longer significant. However, columns 6 and 7, using
the NLSY97, still show significant coefficients on both family income and its square,
even when controlling for parent education and ability level. The difference between
columns 6 and 7 is that column 6 controls for the education of the parents the child
lives with (for example a mother and step-father) while column 7 controls for the
respondent’s biological parents. In both cases we see first a decrease in education as
family income increases and then an increase.
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Sample Size 2,747 2,719 2,179
R2 0.132 0.418 0.437
NLSY97




















PIAT(97) !*** !*** !***
Parent’s Education !(res)*** !(bio)**
Sample Size 7,362 5,056 3,013 3,969
R2 0.165 0.266 0.301 0.311
Significant at: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
Robust standard errors in ( )
All regressions control for race and sex and use custom sample weights provided by the NLSY.
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The ideal explanatory variable for the regressions in Table 1.12 would be average
family consumption for the eighteen years of a person’s childhood. Because of data
limitations, I am forced to use average family income, measured for between 1 and
7 years. Assuming that yearly family income is a noisy measurement of permanent
family income (which should be a good proxy for family consumption), the measure-
ment error on my main explanatory variable will be heteroskedastic, with a larger
error variance for observations that average fewer years of family income. As a sim-
ple correction for this heteroskedasticity, the regressions presented in Table 1.12 use
robust standard errors.
Because I am forced to use family income instead of family consumption as my
explanatory variable, the question may arise as to whether or not I would still get
a U-shaped eduction decision in the simulated data using the log of the parent’s
second period income (rather than consumption). In Table 1.13, I present results of
the same regressions presented in Table 1.12, using the simulated data discussed in
section 4. This simulated data comes from the baseline model in which agents are
allowed to borrow the full cost of education. I present results for both the loss aversion
model and the habit-formation-only model. Both family income and its square are
significant and have the expected sign for all three regressions with the simulated
loss aversion data. This is not true for any of the regressions on the simulated habit
formation model. In that model, adding ability, column 5, explains almost all the
variation in education (R2 = 0.922). Note that adding ability to the loss aversion
model only gives an R2 of 0.34, similar to the results in Table 1.12. Finally, column
7 in Table 1.13 presents the results from a linear regression on the simulated data
from the habit-formation-only model. In this case, the coefficient on family income
is significant at 5%, but is negative.
Figure 1.10 graphs the decision rule for education implied by column 6 from Table
1.12, along with the 95% confidence interval. The graph is for a white male (who
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Table 1.13: Regression Results for Child’s Education on Simulated Data with Parent
Wage as Explanatory Variable
Variable Loss Aversion Habit Formation Only






























Ability (ψ) !*** !*** !*** !*** !***
Parent’s Education !*** !* !*
Sample Size 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
R2 0.007 0.340 0.357 0.000 0.922 0.922 0.922
Figure 1.10: U-Shaped Education Investment Regression Results with 95% Confi-
dence Interval
scored in the 75th percentile of the PIAT) with parents who each have the average level
of parental education. This figure shows significant differences in the level of education
received across the family income spectrum. The graph also highlights the main
weakness of the results, namely that the minimum of the U-shape is approximately
$7,600 (in 2007 dollars), a very low average family income. In fact, the fifth percentile
of the average family income in the data set is $5,800 and the tenth percentile is
$10,400. So there is not a lot of sample weight behind the left side of the U in Figure
1.10. Only about seven percent of the observations have an average family income
less than $7,600.
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Another implication of the model with loss aversion that can be tested with the
NLSY is that there is a wider distribution of ability at the higher education levels.
Table 1.10 shows that the loss aversion model is able to generate more variance
at the higher levels of education than the model with only habit formation. This
is because agents with a wider range of ability invest in higher levels of education
with loss aversion than with only habit formation. Table 1.14 gives the number
of observations, the mean ability score (AFQT for the NLSY79 and PIAT for the
NLSY97), and standard deviation of the ability score for each level of education
(measured in years completed). As we would expect from both types of models, the
mean ability level generally increases as the education level increases. Those earning
a high school diploma had an average AFQT score of 28.7 and an average PIAT score
of 66.5. Those with a BA, or 16 years of education, had an average AFQT score of
64.3 and PIAT score of 80.0.
The data sets show opposite results when it comes to the variance of ability by ed-
ucation. In the older NLSY79, the standard deviation increases almost monotonically
until 17 years of education after which it decreases slightly. This seems to support
the idea that people choosing more education have a wider range of ability. On the
other hand, the NLSY97 shows almost the opposite trend, with standard deviations
of ability decreasing as the level of education increases. The likely reason for this
discrepancy is that the respondents in the NLSY97 were only between the ages of 22
and 27 in the last round of interviews. Thus only older respondents with very high
ability (and determination) have completed the highest levels of education. Only 24
respondents, or 0.5% of the total, have completed more than 18 years of education,
and only 7.5% have more than a college degree. In comparison, 3.5% of the total in
the NLSY79 cohort have more than 18 years of education and 10.3% have more than
a college degree.
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Table 1.14: Mean and Variance of Ability Scores by Education in the NLSY
NLSY79 (AFQT) NLSY97 (PIAT)
Highest Grade Completed Number Mean St. Dev. Number Mean St. Dev.
7 37 7.3 8.5 61 59.3 17.7
8 100 8.7 8.7 305 62.1 18.9
9 176 10.9 12.7 389 63.6 15.7
10 172 12.4 13.3 425 63.4 16.0
11 216 13.6 12.8 444 65.0 17.5
12 3,179 28.7 22.4 1,569 66.5 17.2
13 640 37.8 24.2 542 72.1 15.5
14 782 45.4 24.8 585 72.7 15.6
15 367 46.1 25.0 355 75.0 14.7
16 864 64.3 25.1 812 80.0 13.6
17 202 65.4 25.5 327 83.9 12.9
18 286 71.2 22.4 94 87.2 10.5
19 118 76.5 21.6 21 86.6 11.6
20 146 75.0 23.9 3 90.7 4.7
1.6 Conclusion
A simple model with loss-averse preferences and education investment can generate
a positive and significant intergenerational income correlation, even when agents are
able to borrow the entire (direct) cost of their education and earning ability is com-
pletely independent across generations. Previous work has shown that observable
factors such as IQ, schooling, and personality, can only explain approximately half
of the currently accepted value of the intergenerational correlation of income of 0.6.
Loss averse preferences can explain about half the unexplained correlation (0.14). A
model with concave preferences and habit formation can only generate similar levels of
the intergenerational income correlation when there are severe borrowing constraints
that prevent students from borrowing the cost of education. While some students,
especially in historically disadvantaged groups, may face difficulty in borrowing for
post-secondary schooling, this does not seem to describe the experience of most stu-
dents in the U.S.
While precise welfare statements are not possible in this partial equilibrium model,
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it seems likely that loss aversion in this model generates behavior that is socially
inefficient, in that a sizable portion of the population invests less in education than is
socially optimal. They do this because capital markets are imperfect and they cannot
bring earnings from the second period into the first period. Those who can avoid a loss
in the first period by investing in less education than what would maximize lifetime
resources actually increase their lifetime utility at the cost of total output. If agents
could borrow against future earnings they would invest in more education and total
output would increase.
The baseline model with loss aversion and weak borrowing constraints generates
a positive correlation of income mainly by generating an affluence net. Children
born at the top of the income distribution tend to get more education in order to
avoid losses in the second period of life. The loss averse model is able to generate
an affluence net and a percentage of children who jump up from the bottom quintile
to the top that match those rates found by Hertz (2005) and Mazumder (2008) for
white families. However, the loss-averse model (with independent earnings ability)
is unable to generate a significant poverty trap, again consistent with data for white
families. Allowing for the heritability of earning ability does generate a poverty trap,
but it also increases the affluence net to what appears to be an unreasonable level,
while reducing the jump up rate to an unrealistic level.
I explore alternative explanations for the poverty trap experienced by some black
families in related work (Malloy, 2010). Standard explanations for the black poverty
trap include labor market discrimination and lower earning ability, perhaps due to
lower quality primary education or the health effects related to poverty. In addition
to these explanations, I explore the possibility that black children may have lower
aspirations than white children. Mazumder (2008) finds that black children born in
the bottom half of the income distribution are much less likely to jump up a quintile
than are their white counterparts. If these children have generally lower aspirations
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they will invest in less education. If low aspirations are combined with labor market
discrimination, a loss aversion model can generate a significant poverty trap.
If we believe that people are indeed making their education-investment decisions
with loss averse preferences and, therefore, that the outcome is not efficient, there
is a role for public policy. Many industrialized countries have eliminated the direct
cost of post-secondary education for those who qualify. While this would help reduce
the inefficiency, additional policies may also improve welfare. The main role of public
policy should be improving the market for education loans, and in particular should
promote the ability to borrow beyond the direct cost of education so that students are
able to live a more normal life while in school. Given that there is a direct individual
benefit of education, in the form of higher future wages, it makes sense that the
individual should bear the cost. The fact that there are positive social benefits as
well, in the form of higher total output, provides ample reason for the government
to be involved in improving these capital markets. The United Kingdom actually
conducted a pilot experiment in 1999, in which it paid students to stay in school after
the age of 16. Dearden et al (2007) found that students did stay in school longer than
a control group.
School districts in the United States have also begun experiments in which stu-
dents are paid either to stay in school, for attendance and good behavior, or for
earning higher grades. These experiments are still in their early phases and I do not
believe there is any published research on their results. The school district in Tucson,
Arizona has started a pilot program of paying students $25 a week for good behavior,
good grades, and (implicitly) staying in school. The Education Innovation Lab at
Harvard University, run by economist Roland Fryer, has run four experiments in four
cities. While it is still too early to measure many outcomes, especially whether or
not cash payments prevent students from dropping out, some of the experiments have
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met with some success.6
Is there evidence that loss aversion is important to education-investment decisions?
Page, Garboua, and Montmarquette (2007) conduct an experiment in which people
are asked to make a costly education-like investment in order to increase future earn-
ings. Their findings suggest that people do have loss-averse preferences when making
these types of investments. In this paper, I show that when agents have loss-averse
preferences, there is a U-shaped education investment decision in reference consump-
tion, which is not the case if preferences are concave everywhere. Using the NLSY
data set I find support for this U-shaped decision rule, with those at the lower end of
the parental income distribution investing more in education than those immediately
above them.
Loss aversion has been found to help explain phenomena as diverse as trade policy
(Tovar, 2009), asset pricing (Yugo 2008), and physician behavior (Rizzo and Zeck-
hauser, 2003). It has also recently been found to be present in capuchin monkeys
(Silberberg et al, 2008). While models with loss aversion do present some serious
technical challenges to economic theorists, it is time to make loss aversion a standard
part of our economic toolbox. While there may be some cost in analytical tractability
of our models, the benefit will be in the ability to better model reality.
6Fryer shared some of these results with Time magazine in the article “Should Kids




Low Aspirations, Loss Aversion,
and Persistent Group Outcomes
Black and white workers display significant differences in their labor market outcomes.
Black workers tend to have less education and earn lower income than their white
counterparts at each level of education. This paper explores three possibilities (wage
discrimination, lower earning ability, and low aspirations) for these gaps within the
framework of a model with loss aversion and inherited reference consumption. When
people have loss-averse preferences, low aspirations lead to lower levels of chosen
education. Loss aversion and low aspirations can lead to education outcomes similar
to those caused by outright discrimination or lower earnings ability. When combined
with wage discrimination, the model with low aspirations can also help explain the
larger poverty trap and lower affluence net observed for black families as opposed
to white families. Simulation results compare favorably to inter-generational quintile
transition rates in the literature from both the PSID and the NLSY. The paper also
shows that even without lower earning ability or aspirations this type of model offers
one explanation for the spike in the relative number of black workers with less than
a high school degree that occurred after the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s. In
the model it takes many generations to reach educational equality after a period of
wage discrimination is ended.
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2.1 Introduction
The history of black workers in the United States labor market is marked by inequality
of opportunity and of outcomes. In the midst of the civil rights movement in 1960,
black workers were paid only about 60% of the wages of their white counterparts
according to Card and Krueger (1992). They show that one of the main components
of this wage gap was the lower return to schooling for (especially southern) black
workers. Given this lower marginal benefit to education and legal barriers to higher
education for black students in many parts of the country, it is not surprising that
compared to white workers, only about half as many black workers graduated from
high school and even less from college compared to white workers. But it has now been
over four decades, or two generations, since the civil rights legislation of the 1960s was
passed, and there remains a persistent gap in both educational attainment and median
income at each education level between black workers and white workers. Controlling
only for education, black workers still earn only about 85% (at the median) of their
white counterparts and receive only about half as many advanced degrees.
Why have we so far been unable to eradicate this persistent gap in educational
and labor market outcomes? The existing literature offers a number of possible ex-
planations. Card and Krueger (1992) show that improved quality of black education
contributed to the decline in the black-white wage gap from 1960 to 1980, and Maxwell
(1994) concludes that the difference in the quality of education between black and
white students during the 1980s can explain as much as two-thirds of the level of the
wage gap. Urzua (2008) claims that unobserved cognitive ability is the main driver of
the education gap and Neal and Johnson (1996) show that the results of the Armed
Forces Qualification Test taken at age 18 (basically at the end of free secondary edu-
cation) can explain much of the wage gap. These last two beg the question of where
these two gaps come from and both leave open the possibility that lower quality
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primary and secondary education is driving the results.
Another possibility, expored in Grodsky and Pager (2001), is that black workers
face a larger wage gap as they move up the career ladder, so that the differences
observed in the data are mainly driven by an effective career ceiling faced by black
workers. Another possibility is that black workers self select into different types of
jobs that pay less. Grodsky and Pager find that black workers face less of a wage gap
in the public sector than in the private sector which may push them into that arena.
Underlying each of these papers is the question of whether (and how much) black
workers still face outright discrimination in the labor market. That is, how much less
are they being paid for being equally productive as white workers? If discrimination
is the main driver of the wage gap, then a policy of equal pay for equal work should
have helped (and continue to help) eliminate both the wage and education gap. If,
on the other hand, the gap is driven by lower quality education, self-selection into
different fields or types of jobs, or something else, then the policy solution may be
more complex.
Some recent research has considered the idea that black students face a culture
that is less accepting of academic success. Fordham and Ogbu (1986) introduced
the possibility that successful black students are ostracized by their peers for “acting
white” and Fryer (2010) finds additional empirical support for the theory, especially in
schools with more interaction between the races. Cook and Ludwig (1996) find little
support for this theory, but Kao and Tienda (1998) find that while young students
of all races tend to have high educational aspirations, black and Hispanic students
find these aspirations harder to maintain as they progress through high school. Both
Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have built theoretical
models in which identity in a group can lead a person to choose what appear to be
suboptimal investments in education in order to avoid social costs that outweigh the
income benefits.
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Another major difference between black and white labor market outcomes is the
matrices of intergenerational transition rates between income quintiles. Mazumder
(2008) shows that white children are much less likely to be caught in the poverty trap
in which those born in the bottom quintile of the parental income distribution remain
there as adults. With perfect intergenerational mobility, the transition rates between
income quintiles would be a uniform 20%. Only 24.9% of white children born in the
bottom quintile stay there as adults whereas 43.7% of black children are caught in this
poverty trap. On the other hand, white children enjoy a significant affluence net in
which 38.9% of those born in the top quintile stay there as adults. The comparable
number for black children is only 21.3%. The difference in these intergenerational
transition rates is one of the puzzles that this paper attempts to solve.
The model presented in this paper does not directly punish members in the group
for investing more in education, as in Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), but proposes
that members in different groups may measure “success” differently, similar (in spirit)
to Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Specifically, this paper extends a behavioral model
presented in Malloy (2010) in which heterogeneous agents have loss-averse preferences
and measure utility compared to the level of their parents’ consumption which they
enjoyed as a child. That model showed that agents will often invest in less education
than would maximize their lifetime resources in order to avoid a loss in the first (or
educational) period of life. This is true even when capital markets allow them to
borrow the entire cost of education (but not when there are perfect capital markets
that would allow them to move income from the second period into the first).
In this paper, I explore three possible explanations for the black-white gaps in
education and median income. The first is that the group of disadvantaged workers
face labor market discrimination. While all workers have the same underlying “earning
ability”, the marginal benefit of investing in each subsequent year of education is
lower for disadvantaged workers due to wage discrimination. Second, I allow for the
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possibility of differences in the distribution of the underlying earning ability, perhaps
due to lower quality primary and secondary education, so that the populations of the
two groups are not the same once they reach the labor market. Finally, I allow for the
possibility that the disadvantaged group has lower aspirations than their counterparts
in the advantaged group. That is, reference consumption is lower for this group than
for the advantaged group, perhaps because generations of discrimination have led to
a culture of lower expectations.
I show that all three of these explanations can, with varying success, match the
education distribution of black workers compared to white workers. All three candi-
date explanations imply a larger poverty trap for the disadvantaged group, in which
the children of the poor stay poor, and a lower affluence net implying that those in
the disadvantaged group who are lucky enough to be born at the top of the income
distribution are not as likely to stay there as those in the advantaged group who were
born at the top. However, only wage discrimination is able to explain the black-
white wage gap in median income conditioned on education that we observe in the
data at all education levels. When there are differences in the distribution of earning
ability, but no wage discrimination, then fewer members of the disadvantaged group
will invest in higher levels of education, but those that do will be paid the same as
those in the advantaged group because their underlying ability is the same. A model
with wage discrimination and low aspirations (but the same underlying distribution
of earning ability) does the best in matching the observed differences in the education
distribution and median income of black and white workers.
Finally, I calculate the transition toward equality that would come in the model
after a period of wage discrimination that is finally eliminated. I show that it can
take many generations for the education distribution to equalize across groups in a
model with loss aversion and inherited reference consumption. If the disadvantaged
group develops low aspirations, perhaps due to the generations of outright labor
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discrimination, the education distributions will never equalize. On the other hand,
getting rid of discrimination in the labor market is enough to equalize median income
levels (controlling for education level) in the model. If discrimination is completely
eliminated this equalization happens immediately. However, due to loss aversion
and inherited reference consumption the model exhibits large shifts in the education
distribution of the disadvantaged group which actually lead these workers to have a
higher median income, especially at the lower levels of education. This is because the
earning ability of the median worker of the disadvantaged group is higher than that of
the advantaged group at low levels of education. This is not seen in the data. In fact,
the education distribution is equalizing faster in the data than the model predicts,
showing that there are other forces at work. However, the model does match the
observation of a relative spike in high school dropouts that we see in the data after
the passage of the civil rights legislation in the 1960s.
The next section provides a brief description of the model and the group level
differences. Section 3 describes the data of the black-white education and wage gaps
including differences in intergenerational transition rates between income quintiles. I
describe the calibration and present simulation results in section 4. Section 5 describes
the transition of the education distribution and median income levels after a period of
labor market discrimination that is either immediately or slowly eliminated. I present




The basic model is a sequential generations model in which agents have loss averse
preferences as explained in detail in Malloy (2010). Agents live for three periods:
period 0, or childhood; period 1, in which agents may invest in education and/or
work; and period 2 in which agents work, reproduce, and pass on a bequest to the
next generation. In period 0, agents receive their reference consumption, c0, and a
possible bequest, T , from the previous generation. Agents also learn their “earning
ability,” ψ, which is best thought of as a combination of some sort of inherent ability
and the quality of their education up to the mandatory age of enrollment, usually 16
in the United States.
The agent’s problem is given by equation (1) below. The per period utility func-
tion, U(zt) is assumed to represent loss averse preferences (discussed below) and each
agent receives warm glow utility from leaving a bequest, T ′, to the next generation,
described by B(T ′). Given the agent’s state variables, namely reference consump-
tion, c0, bequest from the previous generation, T , and earning ability, ψ, she chooses
education level, e, consumption in each period, and the bequest she will leave to the
next generation to maximize lifetime utility. Utility depends on relative consump-




constraint is represented by Ω in equations (1b) and (1c) and gives a limit to how
much may be borrowed (s) in period 1, and also places a limit on how much may be
spent on the direct cost of education, ε(e), in equation (1c). Different values of Ω
were discussed in Malloy (2009). In this paper I will generally assume that agents can
borrow the full cost of education. Equations (1d) and (1e) represent the per period
budget constaints, with the wage, ω(e, ψ) depending on both education and earning
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ability, while (1f) assures that consumption and bequests are nonnegative.
V (c0, T, ψ) = max
e,c1,c2,T ′
U(z1) + β[U(z2) +B(T
′)] (1a)
s.t.
s ≥ Ω (1b)
ε(e) ≤ T + Ω (1c)
c1 + s+ ε(e) = (1 − e)ω(e, ψ) + T (1d)
c2 + T
′ = ω(e, ψ) + s(1 + r) (1e)
c1, c2, T
′ ≥ 0 (1f)
There are two main features of loss-averse preferences. First, while utility for
consumption above the reference level (zt ≥ 0) is assumed to be concave, utility for
consumption below the reference level (zt < 0) is assumed to be convex, so that there
is both a decreasing marginal utility to gains and a decreasing marginal disutility to
losses. The main consequence of this is that while an agent will smooth gains across
periods whenever possible, he will lump losses into one period in order to avoid (or
decrease) a loss in the other period. The second main feature of loss-averse preferences
is that the marginal utility around zero is assumed to be steeper for a loss than for a














for zt < 0
(2)
I use constant absolute risk aversion utility, as suggested by Kobberling and
Wakker (2004), because it allows for strong loss aversion as discussed in Nielson
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Figure 2.1: Strong Loss Aversion Utility and Marginal Utility
(2002). The utility function U(·) is strongly loss averse if U(0) = 0 and U ′(y) ≤
U ′(z) ∀z < 0 < y. In this case, since zt is measured in percentage terms (and
so has a minimum at -1) we can say that U(·) is strongly loss averse iff U ′(−1) ≥
U ′(0)+ where U ′(0)+ is the marginal utility as zt approaches 0 from the right. A
strongly loss averse utility function is represented in figure 2.1(a) and marginal utility
in figure 2.1(b). This simplifies the consumption-savings calculation, as in Bowman et
al. (1999), and I make the assumption of strong loss aversion throughout the paper.
The direct cost of education, given by ε(e), is given by equation (3). The function
ε(e) is assumed to be (at least weakly) convex so that the last unit of education
costs at least as much as the first unit. Formally, I require φ1, φ2 ≥ 0. In fact, the
first “unit” of voluntary education, finishing high school, is free for students at public
schools in the United States while the last year of school, such as in a medical or law
program can be quite expensive, even at a public university.
ε(e) = φ1e+ φ2e
2 (3)
The function B(T ′) in equation (1) gives the utility gained from leaving a bequest
of size T ′. This type of bequest is known as a warm glow bequest because the person
giving the bequest does not take the utility of the person receiving the bequest directly
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Because zt is measured in percentage terms, it is useful to scale bequests by the
level of reference consumption. If θ = µ then the agent sets T
′
c0
= z2 when z2 ≥ 0
or T ′ = c2 − c0. In many cases, however, agents will optimally have zero gain in the
second period, in order to minimize losses in period one. An agent consuming at (or
below) the reference level of consumption in period 2 will leave no bequest to the next
generation.
The nonconcavity of loss-averse preferences presents a number of problems in
solving the model. Given the widely replicated experimental evidence of loss aversion
in a number of different settings, these problems represent the main reason that
loss averse models have not been more widely adapted. In this paper (as in Malloy
(2009)), I make a number of assumptions, following Bowman et all (1999), that allow
the model to be solved.
First, it should be noted that first order conditions will not allow us to solve the
agent’s problem, as the second order conditions for a maximization fail due to the
convex preferences when consumption is less than the reference level of consumption,
c0. Another potential problem introduced by the nonconcavity of the model is the
possibility of multiple equilibria. Because of the decreasing marginal disutility of a
loss, an agent who faces a loss will want to lump the loss (as much as possible) into
one period. In multi-period models, this gives the very real possibility of multiple
equilibria as the agent will not care in which period she takes the loss (so long as the
standard assumption that β(1 + r) = 1 is made).
In order to find a unique equilibrium I first make the assumption of strong loss
aversion so that the marginal utility of any sized loss is larger than the marginal
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utility of any gain, as noted above. This makes the consumption-savings decision for
the agent clear cut as he will always (when possible) reduce a gain in one period in
order to reduce a loss in another. Also, an agent facing losses in both periods will
take as large a loss as possible in one period in order to reduce the loss in the other
period. Because the borrowing constraint will bind in the first, or education, period,
consumption in that period will never be larger than in the second period. Of course,
agents that face gains in both periods will try to smooth them as in a standard model,
subject to the borrowing constraint.
2.2.2 Group Differences
In this version of the model there will be two groups indexed by j ∈ {A,D}, where A
represents an advantaged majority group and D a (possibly) disadvantaged minority
group. There are three possible ways in which the minority group may face disadvan-
tages in the model. First, they may receive lower quality primary education, lowering
their average level of earning ability:
ψji = ρψ
j
i−1 + (1 − ρ)ψ̄
j + χi
χi ∼ N(0, (1 − ρ
2)σ2ψ)
The parameter ρ represents the possibility that earning ability is heritable, al-
though in the baseline model I assume that it is independent across generations so
that ρ = 0. To account for the possibility that the minority group receives lower
quality education I allow the mean of the distribution, ψ̄, to vary by group so that
if education quality is lower for the minority group than for the majority group we
have ψ̄A > ψ̄D. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 2.2, where panel (a) shows
69
Figure 2.2: Shift in Earning Ability and Resulting Wage Function
the shift of the distribution in the disadvantaged group’s earning ability to the left
and panel (b) shows the resulting wage for someone with earning ability ψ̄A and ψ̄D
at each level of education. As can be seen by widening of the difference between the
wage curves for the advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the marginal return to
education is also lower for the disadvantaged group.
Second, the model allows for the possibility of labor market discrimination. In
general, a worker’s wage will be equal to her marginal product and will be a func-
tion of both the worker’s earning ability, ψ, and her chosen level of education, ê.
In addition, the disadvantaged group may face some haircut, δ, to its wage. This
form of discrimination is not “rational” on the part of firms which, in a competitive
environment, should be willing to pay each worker a wage equal to his marginal prod-
uct. If, however, the firms have some level of monopsony power or there is a level of
collusion between firms so that this type of discrimination has become accepted and
institutionalized, the workers in group D will have no choice but to accept the wage
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offered. The wage function is given by equation (5).
ln[ωj(e, ψ)] = (1 − δj)[α1e+ α2e
2 + ζeψ + κψ] (5)
Here the parameters α1 and α2 capture the (log) quadratic return to education,
κ is the (log) linear return to earning ability, and ζ is the interaction term between
earning ability and education so that those with higher earning ability get a greater
return to their investments in education. For the advantaged group, A, there is no
haircut in the wage so that δA = 0, whereas the disadvantaged group D faces possible
discrimination so that 0 ≤ δD < 1.
Finally, there may be a behavioral difference between the two groups. With loss
averse preferences, utility is measured relative to some reference point. In this model,
reference consumption is equal to the previous generation’s period two consumption.
That is, agents measure utility by comparing current period consumption to the level
of consumption they enjoyed as a child. If the disadvantaged group, perhaps due to
generations of discrimination, feels they won’t get a fair shake in life, they may lower
their expectations and measure utility against a lower level of reference consumption.
Formally, I model reference consumption as:
cj0,i = (1 + a
j)cj2,i−1
Reference consumption for person i in group j is equal to his parent’s consumption
in period 2 multiplied by some group specific factor, (1+aj). If aj > 0 then agents in
group j measures utility against a reference consumption greater than that of their
parents. While formal expectations do not enter into this model, we can interpret
a positive aj to mean that children expect to do better than their parents. On the
other hand, if aj < 0, then children measure utility against some level of consumption
less than that of their parents. That is, they expect to do worse than their parents.
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For simplicity, and in order to keep the model stationary, I assume that aA = 0 while
I allow aD to be less than zero. In the popular discourse, and in an economy with
positive average growth, we usually ask if children expect to do better than their
parents in real terms. In this model, with no growth, we can think of this mechanism
as asking whether children expect to do better (or the same, or worse) than their
parents in terms of their placement in the income distribution.
The main effect of the parameter aj is that it can change the utility maximizing
level of education for two agents from different groups who are otherwise identical.
The solution methodology is described in the next section, but the intuition is sim-
ply that by shifting the reference point, agents can face a loss at different levels of
education investment. For example, imagine a person with earning ability above the
mean who would maximize lifetime resources by getting a master’s degree, maybe
an MBA. Investing this much in education may force the person to realize a loss.
For a child from the advantaged group, if c0 is high enough, a first period loss is
unavoidable in any case, so the optimal decision is to choose the resource maximizing
level of education. But for a disadvantaged child, if aD is low enough, the adjusted
reference level of consumption may be low enough that the child will be able to avoid
the loss in the first period by reducing her investment in education. Therefore, she
may be “satisfied” with only getting a bachelor’s degree while her counterpart from
the advantaged group goes on to get the MBA, accepting the inevitable loss in the
first period.
In this way, wages for the disadvantaged group will be lower than those with similar
earning ability in the advantaged group through the equilibrium level of education
chosen by the members in each group. Even if there is no current discrimination and
no differences in the distribution of earning ability across groups, there may still exist
wage differentials that are best understood as the legacy of past discrimination which
has affected current preferences and expectations. Note, however, that the model
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implies that these wage differentials will disappear once one controls for education.
Of course, in reality it is quite possible that these three possible explanations for
the white-black disparities in education and wages work at the same time. In section
4, I present both simulations that allow only for a single explanation, in order to note
differences and similarities in the three, and simulations involving combinations of
the three, to see which combination can do the best in matching the data.
2.2.3 Solution Methodology
The solution methodology here is the same as in Malloy (2009). Briefly, the assump-
tion of strong loss aversion allows me to solve the consumption and savings problem
for each agent for a given level of education. I can then compare the utility derived
by this solution for each education level and choose the level of education that max-
imizes utility, ê. I can compare this to the level of education that would maximize
lifetime resources, e∗, which is the level that would be chosen in a standard model
with perfect capital markets.
The numerical solution methodology is straightforward. Given the optimal con-
sumption/saving/bequest pattern conditioned on education, I calculate the utility-
maximizing (as well as the resource-maximizing) level of education for each possible
state (where the state consists of reference consumption, earning ability, and bequest).
This education level then gives consumption in each period, saving/borrowing be-
tween periods, and a bequest level for the next generation. I simulate an economy
with N families (NA in the advantaged group and ND in the disadvantaged group,
where N = NA +ND), each starting with a normally-distributed randomly assigned
earning ability, reference consumption, and bequest. I calculate the education choice,
ê, for each person in the initial generation as well as their consumption in each period,
savings and bequest. I then assign a random earning ability level to each of the N
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agents in the next period and carry over their reference consumption and bequest
level from the previous generation. I can then calculate the correlation of education,
wages, consumption, and bequests between generations. I run the simulation for 100
generations and check to make sure that the distribution of wages, consumption, and
bequests has converged1.
Because each agent’s choice depends only on her specific state variables (refer-
ence consumption, earning ability, and bequest), I can run the simulation separately
for each group and calculate the education distribution and median wage at each
education level. I then combine the two populations in order to calculate the wage
and education gap of the disadvantaged group as well as the overall intergenerational
transition rates between income quintiles for each group.
2.3 Data
Differences in education levels and labor market outcomes between white and black
workers in the United States have been well documented, even if explanations for these
differences have differed. This section reviews key facts to establish target moments
for the calibration and goal posts by which the various calibrations in the next section
can be tested. As we will see, while the model offers a number of possible explanations
for the lower education levels and wages for black workers, not all explanations will
be able to match the other statistics, such as the income quintile transition rates,
which differ substantially by race. Other literature reviewed here will add stronger a
priori support for some of the model mechanisms than others.
1For wages, for example, I add up the wages in each decile and then take the norm of the difference
between generations. For convergence, I require this to be less than some number ε.
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Figure 2.3: Education Distribution and Median Income Levels by Race
2.3.1 Education Levels and Labor Market Outcomes
The columns in figure 2.3 plot the education distribution (on the left axis) for white
and black full-time workers aged 25-64 in 2007 according to the Current Population
Survey. The percentage of high school dropouts is almost identical for both groups:
7.95% for white workers and 7.67% for black workers. The major difference in the
two populations is that compared to white workers, a much larger percentage of
black workers finish with a high school degree or with something short of a bachelor’s
degree. At the upper end of the education distribution, only 1.67% of black workers
have a PhD or professional degree as opposed to 3.45% of white workers, and those
with master’s degrees account for only 6.24% of black workers but almost 10% of
white workers. So at least for full-time workers, the education distribution for black
workers is not a simple shift to the left of the distribution for white workers, but
rather a clumping in the high school graduate and some college categories. The same
is true if the sample is restricted to 25-34 year olds.
A more inclusive sampling including all people over the age of 25 shows a similar
pattern, with the only significant change being at the bottom. The percentage of
white people over the age of 25 who have not graduated from high school jumps to
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almost 9% while the percentage of black people who have not finished high school
is 9.8%. These numbers are 8.8% and 9.4%, respectively, when only including ages
25-64. This shows that there is a small but significant number of poorly educated
people who do not participate in the labor market and that the percentage of such
people is slightly higher for black people than for their white counterparts. It should
be noted that the CPS accounts only for the non-institutionalized population. The
prison population represents a much larger percentage of the black population, and
of these 44% have not finished high school, compared to 27% of white prisoners in
1997 (Harlow, 2003). In this paper, I will focus on those working full time in the
labor market and abstract from the issues facing those at the very bottom of the
income and education distributions such as chronic unemployment, the non-formal
labor market, and the risk of prison.
The solid lines (and right axis) of figure 2.3 show the median income by education
level for white and black workers. Black workers consistently earn less than white
workers at any given education level. Note, however, that the difference is not con-
stant across education levels. For example, for those who have not graduated from
high school, black workers earn 92% of what white workers earn. Black high school
graduates and college graduates earn just under 83% of what white workers in the
same category earn while those with Master’s degrees earn 91% of their white coun-
terparts. At the top level of education, black workers with a PhD or professional
degree earn less than 82% as much as their white counterparts.
The income distribution by education level for black workers is substantially differ-
ent in some cases than the distribution for white workers. Figure 4 gives the income
distribution for white and black workers at four different education levels. At the
lower education levels, high school dropout and high school graduate, the income
distribution for black workers is shifted slightly to the left with a fatter left tail and a
skinnier right tail. Note, however, that the mode of each distribution is more or less
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Figure 2.4: Income Distribution by Race at Four Education Levels
the same. The distribution for those with a Bachelor’s degree is similar. However,
the distribution for black workers with higher levels of education is substantially dif-
ferent than that for white workers. For those with a Master’s degree, there appears
to be a much more pronounced bimodal distribution for black workers than for white
workers. This suggests the possibility that different types of workers achieve a high
level of education in the different racial groups.
Intergenerational transition rates between income quintiles also differ by race.
Hertz (2005) (in the Panel Study of Income Dynamic, PSID) and Mazumder (2008)
(in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, NLSY) calculate the intergenerational
transition rates between income quintiles. Transition rates for the overall population
are fairly symmetric. However, significant asymmetries emerge when the data are
broken down by race. Figure 2.5 graphs the transition rates from Mazumder (2008)
for white and black families. I look at four main transition rates in the data: the
well documented poverty trap, defined as the fraction of children born in the bottom
quintile who stay in the bottom; the affluence net, defined as the fraction of those
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Figure 2.5: Intergenerational Income Quintile Transition Rates
born into the top quintile who stay at the top; the fall down rate, defined as the
fraction of children born in the top quintile who fall down to the bottom quintile, and
the jump up rate, defined as the fraction of those born at the bottom who jump up
to the top quintile.
If there was perfect intergenerational mobility, all quintile transition rates would
be 20%. For all NLSY workers, Mazumder estimates that the poverty trap is 33.5%,
the affluence net is 37.8%, the jump up rate is 7.4%, and the fall down rate is 10.9%.
A symmetric transition matrix such as this is what we would expect to see if earning
ability was highly correlated between generations. Suppose, for instance, that wages
of successive generations are determined as follows:
ωi = ρωωi−1 + (1 − ρω)ω̄ + ε
ε ∼ N(0, (1 − ρ2ω)σ
2
ε )
Where ωi is the wage of the child and ωi−1 is the wage of the parent. When
ρω = 0.4, the poverty trap and affluence net are around 37.7% and the jump up and
fall down rates are around 6.7%. All of these rates are fairly close to the data.
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However, intergenerational mobility becomes highly asymmetric when the data are
disaggregated by race. Figure 2.5 shows that white families experience a significant
affluence net (38.9%), a fairly low poverty trap (24.9%), and similar jump up and
fall rates of around 10.5%. Almost the opposite is true for black families. These
families face a large poverty trap (43.7%), a low affluence net (21.3%), a very low
jump up rate (4.1%), and a fairly large fall down rate (21.6%). Hertz (2005) finds
very similar transition rates in the PSID for white families and even more extreme
transition rates, in the same direction as Mazumder (2008), for black families. Given
the asymmetric transition rates by race, a successful model will need to explain why
poor black children are more likely to be caught in the poverty trap and why rich
white children are more likely to be supported by the affluence net.
2.3.2 Possible Explanations for Racial Disparities
There have been many papers written trying to explain the black-white wage gap.
These papers were especially fashionable from the 1970s through the 1990s and come
to a number of different conclusions. Card and Krueger (1992) find the black-white
wage differential fell from about 40% in 1960 to 25% in 1980. They attribute one-fifth
of this decrease to the change in the quality of education for black children over that
time. Grodsky and Pager (2001) look at the occupational structure of black and white
earnings and find that, within the private sector, racial wage differentials increase as
workers move up the career ladder, even controlling for individual characteristics.
They find that this is not the case in the public sector. Neal and Johnson (1996) rely
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, taken between the ages of 16-18, as a measure
of skill and find that it can explain most of the black-white wage gap, although they
leave room for some (small) level of labor market discrimination. They suggest that
the wage gap failed to narrow after 1980 because of a significant lingering skills gap.
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Urzua (2008) attempts to control for both observed and unobserved ability, allowing
the schooling decision to be endogenous to the model. He finds that unobserved
cognitive ability has a large impact on the realized level of education, but still leaves
the majority of the wage gap unexplained.
Recent work on labor market discrimination against black workers suggests that
it still exists and can take quite insidious forms. Charles and Guryan (2008) test the
model presented by Becker (1957) that predicts that the wages of black workers will
be lower in areas with more racial prejudice. They present robust findings that this is
indeed the case with labor market discrimination especially affecting black workers in
areas of the country in which the marginal white worker has more prejudicial views.
They calculate that one quarter of the black-white wage gap is due to this form of
discrimination. In an experiment to test the possible discrimination of employers,
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) sent out identical resumes to job advertisements
with either traditionally white or black sounding names. They found that the resumes
with black-sounding names, such as Jamal Jones or Lakisha Washington, get 50%
fewer callbacks than did the same resumes with white-sounding names, such as Emily
Walsh or Greg Baker. Because this was a controlled randomized experiment, the
authors conclude that racial discrimination is still prevalent in the U.S. labor market.
As Urzua (2008) says, his analysis is unable to explain the source of differences
in the unobserved ability between races. He postulates that such differences could be
due to “unmeasured racial differences in early family environment including prenatal
family environment, unmeasured racial differences in early schooling environment,
cultural differences between groups, biological/genetic differences between groups,
or, most likely, a combination of all of these.” As noted above, Card and Krueger
(1992) believe that an increase in the relative quality of education helped reduce the
black-white wage gap after the end of Jim Crow laws. Maxwell (1994) finds evidence
that the quality of schooling is the main driver of differences in skills between black
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and white workers and claims that it can explain as much as two-thirds of the wage
gap. Her explanation is that black students come out of compulsory schooling with
much lower basic skills than do their white counterparts, leading to lower levels of
post-secondary education and lower wages. In fact, some research finds that once
family background and educational ability (such as test scores at the end of high
school, for example) are controlled for, black students go on to get at least as much
education as their white counterparts (e.g. Bennett and Lutz, 2009).
While the model in this paper allows for both discrimination and racial differences
in ability, it also allows a role for behavioral differences in aspirations. There has been
considerable debate, starting with Fordham and Ogbu (1986) about whether or not
successful black students are ostracized by their peers for “acting white” and are
therefore less likely to strive for academic success. Cook and Ludwig (1996), for
example, find little support for the idea that black students suffer greater penalties
for academic success than do white students. Kao and Tienda (1998), on the other
hand, find that black and Hispanic students find it more difficult to maintain their
high educational aspirations than do white students. They point to the lower socio-
economic status of these students as a reason it may be more difficult to achieve their
educational goals.
Both Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have built
theoretical models in which identity in a group can lead a person to choose what
appear to be suboptimal investments in education in order to avoid social costs that
outweigh the income benefits. The model presented in this paper does not directly
punish members in the disadvantaged group for investing more in education, as in
Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), but proposes that members in different groups may
measure “success” differently. The reference level of consumption, c0, can be inter-
preted as when “failure” or a loss turns into “success” or a gain. The loss-averse agents
in this model do all they can to avoid a loss. But it is quite possible that the point
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at which failure turns into success will differ across groups. While the advantaged
group wants to do at least as well as their parents (so that aA ≥ 0), it is possible
that the disadvantaged group, perhaps due to generations of discrimination or social
mores that are the result of discrimination, measure success at a lower level. That
is, they believe they are consuming at a gain even at a lower consumption level than
their parents (so that aD < 0). In this way, the model is similar in spirit to Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) who allow behavior to differ based on how people identify with
a certain group.
Is it reasonable for black children to expect to do worse than their white counter-
parts? Mazumder (2008) measures racial differences based on where children start in
the income distribution. While most born at the very bottom of the income distribu-
tion will do better than their parents no matter their race (having nowhere to go but
up), this becomes less likely for black children born higher in the income distribution.
For black children born in the 20-40 percentile range, only about half will exceed their
parents’ position in the income distribution, compared to between 60-80% of white
children. Less than 40% of black children born in percentiles 40-50 will exceed their
parents’ position while white children have a better than 50% chance of doing so.
Mazumder also calculates the probability of exceeding one’s parents’ position in the
income distribution by 20 or more percentage points. For white children born in the
bottom quarter of the income distribution this probability is about 60%. For black
children the comparable number is only 40%. Meanwhile, 46% of the white children
born in the bottom half of the income distribution will exceed the income range of
their parents while only 22% of black children will.
This section suggests that there are a number of likely causes for the differences
in black and white labor market outcomes. While it appears that overt labor mar-
ket discrimination has decreased substantially over the last fifty years, there exists
the possibility that such discrimination still exists, at least to some extent. It also
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seems quite plausible that the continuing legacy of Jim Crow is not in overt wage
discrimination but rather in lower quality primary and secondary schooling that is
the result of continued de facto segregation. This leads to lower basic skills for black
students which then results in less completed education and lower earnings. Finally, it
is possible that the expectations for labor market success are lower for black workers
than for their white counterparts, leading them to decrease their reference level of
consumption and define down what constitutes success. In this model, a lower level
of reference consumption will lead black students to get less education, leading to
lower earnings. Each of these three explanations is explored in the next section, first
alone, and then in combination with the others.
2.4 Calibration Results
2.4.1 Parameter Values and Calibration Targets
The calibration methodology is similar to Malloy (2010). In that paper, I calibrated
the model using the parameters in the wage function to match the education distri-
bution and median income levels by education to the population of white, full-time
workers. In this section I use those calibrated values as the starting point and focus
on the differences between the black and white workers, using the three parameters
in this model that allow for group differences. That is, I start with the model cal-
ibrated for white workers and experiment with different values for the parameters
δ, representing possible labor market discrimination, ψ̄D, representing possible lower
earnings ability, and aD, representing the idea that the disadvantaged group may
have lower aspirations than the advantaged group. It is, of course, possible that the
reason black workers have different labor market outcomes is that they face a different
wage function than do white workers. However, in order to focus on the mechanisms
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description Source/Explanation
λ 2.25 Loss aversion parameter Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
µ 0.01 CARA parameter for gains Babcock et al (1993)
ν 0.8 CARA parameter for losses Strong loss aversion
β = R = (1 + r) 1 Rate of time preference & interest rate Simplicity
φ1 0.0 Linear term in cost of education Estimated from Dept. of Education,
φ2 0.3 Quadratic term in cost of education National Ctr. for Education Statistics
e, ψ [0,1] Range for education and earning ability Normalization
ψ̄ 0.5 Average ability level
σψ 0.15 Standard deviation of earning ability, ψ 3 st. dev. above & below the mean
ρ 0.0 Heritability of earning ability Simplicity
explicit in this model, I make the simplifying assumption that the underlying wage
function is the same for both groups.
The main parameter values are presented in table 2.1. I use a CARA parameter
of 0.01 for gains. I use Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) value for the loss aversion
parameter, λ, of 2.25. Other estimates of this parameter in the literature generally
find it to be between 2 and 3. Given that strong loss aversion requires that the
CARA parameter for losses, ν, be less than ln(λ), I let ν be the maximum value of
ln(λ) ≈ 0.8. Because there are only two periods, I allow both β and the gross interest
rate R to equal one. This is done without loss of generality so long as we make the
standard assumption that βR = 1. In order to estimate the direct education costs,
I use the Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, then
normalize against the median income of a high school graduate, assuming each period
is approximately 20 years. I set the direct cost of the first two levels of education,
equivalent to a high school dropout and high school graduate, at zero as most students
in the United States have access to free education through the twelfth grade.
The target moments for white full-time workers are presented in table 2.2 and
the calibrated wage parameters are presented in table 2.3. The left column of table
2.2 shows the fraction of white workers in each education category, calculated using
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Table 2.2: Target and Calibrated Moments for White Population
Moment Target* Model
Education Distribution
High School Dropouts 7.9% 8.8%
High School Grads 28.5% 23.8%
Some College/Assoc. Degree 27.8% 27.5%
Bachelor’s Degree 23.1% 31.0%
Master’s Degree 9.2% 7.2%
Prof. Degrees/PhD 3.5% 1.9%
Median Income by Education Level (HS grad = 1.0)
High School Dropout Wage 0.71 0.75
High School Grad Wage 1.00 1.00
Some College/Assoc. Degree Wage 1.19 1.57
Bachelor’s Degree Wage 1.60 1.65
Master’s Degree Wage 1.80 2.10
Prof. Degrees/PhD Wage 2.71 4.04
* Target is for white, full-time workers.
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Calibrated Value
α1: linear term on education 0.285
α2: quadratic term on education 0.190
ζ: interaction term (education*ability) 0.655
κ: linear term on ability 1.450
Minimum marginal return to education 3.1%
Average marginal return to education 8.4%
Maximum marginal return to education 13.9%
Max-Min Wage Ratio 13.2
CPS data from 2007, as well as the median income for each education level expressed
relative to the median for a high school graduate. The right column of table 2.2
shows the comparable moment implied by the model. The model does a fairly good
job matching for the middle of the education and income distribution and struggles to
match the education distribution at the high end. Table 2.3 also reports the marginal
return to an extra year of education as a check on the calibration. These numbers
vary between 3.1% and 13.9%, with an average of 8.4%, which are reasonable values
according to the literature of wages and education (e.g. Lemieux, 2006).
Table 2.4 presents target moments for black full-time workers. Note that the
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Table 2.4: Target and Calibrated Moments for Black Full-Time Workers
Moment Target*
Education Distribution
High School Dropouts 7.7%
High School Grads 33.2%




Median Income by Education Level (White HS grad = 1.0)
High School Dropout Wage 0.65
High School Grad Wage 0.83
Some College/Assoc. Degree Wage 1.02
Bachelor’s Degree Wage 1.33
Master’s Degree Wage 1.64
Prof. Degrees/PhD Wage 2.21
* Target is for black, full-time workers.
median income for each worker is expressed in terms of the median income for a
white high school graduate. As noted above, black workers have a slightly lower
fraction of high school dropouts than white workers, but a larger fraction with a a
high school degree or some level of college short of a bachelor’s degree. Comparing
tables 2.4 and 2.2, we see that black workers earn less at every level of education than
do white workers.
The first calibration exercise I undertake is attempting to match the target mo-
ments of the black population in table 2.4 by using only one of the three available
parameters reflecting group differences. These results are presented in sections 4.3-
4.5. In section 4.6, I see if combinations of two or more types of group differences
can improve the model fit. But first I see what explanations such as labor market
discrimination and borrowing constraints can do in a model without loss aversion.
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2.4.2 Traditional Explanations in a Standard Model
In Malloy (2010) I find that a model with habit formation and preferences that are
concave everywhere cannot generate a correlation of income across generations unless
there are severe borrowing constraints. In the face of borrowing constraints, the model
does generate some intergenerational persistence in income as the poorest cannot af-
ford to go to school beyond a free high school education. In this section I investigate
whether or not the standard model with wage discrimination and/or borrowing con-
straints can match the target moments of the black worker education distribution and
median income levels and what these models imply for the intergenerational transition
rates between income quintiles.
The only difference between the standard model with habit formation and the
model presented above with loss aversion is that the utility function is now concave




As in equation (5) above, I allow the disadvantaged group to face possible labor
market discrimination. In addition, the model will allow for the possibility that the
bottom portion of the disadvantaged group does not have access to financial markets
and therefore cannot borrow the cost of education. While there are of course no
current legal restrictions that bar black students from borrowing (there are, in fact,
laws prohibiting racial discrimination), there is some evidence that black students are
less likely to avail themselves of the financial resources available to pay for college2,
in part because parents who have not gone to college have less information about
student financial aid options. If this is the case, a borrowing constraint that limits
the very poorest may be a reasonable approximation of reality.
2One such study was done by the United Negro College Fund’s Patterson In-
stitute commissioned by Sallie Mae. A summary of results can be found here:
http://pattersonresearchinstitute.org/SallieMaeFindings.htm
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Figure 2.6: Education and Median Income Ratios with Standard Utility, Habit For-
mation, and Wage Discrimination
Using only the wage discrimination parameter, I find that a value of δ = 0.14 does
the best job of matching the target moments. While the model is able to match the
black-white ratio of the median income levels by education, it is not able to match
the black-white ratio of the share of workers at each education level. The moments
observed in the data and generated by the model are given in figure 2.6. The share
of the disadvantaged workers in each education category is only marginally different
than for advantaged workers.
While Malloy (2010) finds that the standard model with habit formation and no
wage discrimination is not able to generate intergenerational transition rates between
income quintiles that match the data, the introduction of wage discrimination helps
generate realistic transition rates. In fact, the standard model, with δ = 0.14, is
able to generate a poverty trap in the disadvantaged group for the bottom quintile
of 36.4% and for the bottom two quintiles of 53.4%. The corresponding moments
in the data are 43.7% and 67.6%, respectively. While this poverty trap is not quite
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large enough to match the data, it is larger for the bottom 20% than that implied
by the model with loss aversion, as shown in the next section. The model also
generates a smaller jump up rate for disadvantaged workers of 13.8% (compared to
4.1% in the data), but the fall down rate for this group is much too large at 35.9%
(compared to 21.6% in the data). Similarly, the affluence net is too small at 13.4%
for disadvantaged workers, compared to 21.3% in the data. Interestingly, while the
correlation of intergenerational income for the advantaged group is basically zero, for
the disadvantaged group this correlation is slightly negative at -0.013.
Borrowing constraints have the opposite effect of wage discrimination in the model.
That is, the model with borrowing constraints is able to come close to matching
the ratios of worker shares in each education category, but is unable to match the
ratios of median income at each education level. This should not be surprising as
workers in the model without discrimination are paid based on their productivity.
The disadvantaged at each education level are equally productive as their advantaged
counterparts so that the median income levels will only differ when there is a large
difference in which types of worker receive each level of education. The observed and
simulated moments when the bottom 10% of the disadvantaged group is unable to
borrow to finance education are given in figure 2.7.
Given that the model with borrowing constraints is unable to match the median
income by education data, it is not surprising that it does less well in matching the
intergenerational transition rates between income quintiles as well. In this version of
the model there is no poverty trap for those in the disadvantaged group born into the
bottom 20% of the income distribution and only a modest one of 46.9% for those born
into the bottom 40%. There is no significant difference in the affluence net or the rate
at which children fall down from the top quintile to the bottom quintile between the
two groups. The only transition rate this version of the model is able to come close to
matching is the rate at which poor black children jump up from the bottom quintile
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Figure 2.7: Education and Median Income Ratios with Standard Utility, Habit For-
mation, and Borrowing Constraints
to the top. In the data this rate is 4.1% while the model with borrowing constraints
generates a value of 8.2%.
In this version of the model with standard concave utility and habit formation,
a combination of wage discrimination and borrowing constraints does a fair job of
matching the target moments. The main weakness is that it is unable to match
the much lower share of black workers at the three highest levels of education. For
example, in this version of the model, with wage discrimination of 14% and in which
the bottom 5% of the disadvantaged group cannot borrow, the ratio of disadvantaged-
advantaged workers at the top education level is 0.80, as opposed to 0.48 in the data.
The version of the model with both wage discrimination and a borrowing con-
straint does a fairly good job of matching the key intergenerational income transition
rates. For example, it generates a poverty trap for the bottom 20% of the disadvan-
taged group of 39.8% (compared to 43.7% in the data) and 59.7% for the bottom 40%
(compared to 67.6% in the data). It still generates too low of an affluence net (13.8%
90
vs. 21.3%) and the fall down rate is once again larger than in the data. The jump up
rate is 9.1% (compared to 4.1% in the data). As we will see, compared to this model,
the model with loss aversion generates too low of a poverty trap for the bottom 20%,
but does a better job in matching the affluence net and jump up and fall down rates
for black families. The overall correlation of intergenerational income in this version
of the model is a modest 0.028 while for the disadvantaged group it is 0.072.
2.4.3 Wage Discrimination
In this section I explore the effect of labor market discrimination, as captured by the
parameter δ in the wage function (5), on education and median income levels of the
disadvantaged group. Wage discrimination decreases the marginal benefit of an extra
year of education and reduces the numbers of the disadvantaged group that invest in
the higher levels of schooling.
2.4.3.1 Decision Rule
One implication of the loss aversion model discussed in Malloy (2010) is the existence
of a U-shaped education decision rule. Because agents have loss-averse preferences,
reference consumption is important in determining how much education each person
will invest in. Those in the middle of the reference consumption distribution may be
able to avoid a loss in the first period by investing in less education and working more.
Those with higher reference consumption will be more likely to face a loss in the first
period no matter what level of education is chosen, and so will group the loss in the
first period and invest in the level of education that will maximize lifetime resources.
Those at the bottom of the income distribution will find it easier to avoid a loss in
the first period (as their reference level of consumption is low), and so will invest in
more education than those to their right in the reference consumption distribution.
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Figure 2.8 graphs the education decision rule for an agent with earning ability
one standard deviation above the mean and a bequest of T = 0.25 facing no wage
discrimination, and that for an identical agent who does face labor market discrimi-
nation (so that δ > 0). Both groups exhibit the U-shaped decision rule. However, the
decision rule for agents facing discrimination is shifted to the left. This implies that
those facing wage discrimination will in some cases choose a higher (or equal) level
of education than those who do not face such discrimination, all else equal. While
this may seem counterintuitive, it does make sense within the model. Groups facing
discrimination earn lower wages at every level of education. Those with higher wages
may be able to avoid a loss in the first period by investing in a lower level of educa-
tion, while those facing lower wages are more likely to be facing a loss in any event,
and thus optimally invest in more education so as to avoid (or minimize) a loss in the
second period. As can be seen in the graph, there are also areas (at the bottom of
the reference consumption distribution) in which the disadvantaged group chooses a
lower level of education. In this case, because of the lower wages, it does not make
sense to invest in more education, either because it would lead to a loss or because it
would not reduce the loss due to the lower marginal benefit of education on wages.
These results, perhaps surprisingly, agree with the results from the literature (de-
scribed in section 3), which show that when controlling for educational ability and
family background, black students are actually likely to choose more education than
their white counterparts. The story suggested by this model is that disadvantaged
agents are more likely to face unavoidable losses in period one due to wage discrimi-
nation, and therefore optimally choose to invest in more schooling to avoid losses in
period two. Figure 2.8 also graphs the resulting population distribution by reference
consumption for both groups. Because of the lower wages due to discrimination, the
distribution of the disadvantaged group by reference consumption is shifted to the left
compared to the advantaged population. This shift is why the disadvantaged group
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Figure 2.8: Education Decision Rule and Population Distribution with Wage Dis-
crimination
tends to get less education despite the fact that a disadvantaged student will actually
invest in more education than an advantaged student of equal ability and bequest at
higher levels of reference consumption.
2.4.3.2 Matching Education and Wage Ratios
The goal of the calibration in this section is to try to match the black-white ratios
of education levels and median income by education, using only the labor market
discrimination parameter δ. As it happens, a value of δ = 0.14 does the best in
matching the two distributions separately, using a simple Euclidean norm of the dif-
ferences. Both the data (from the CPS) and the model simulation are graphed in
figure 2.9. In the education distribution (the top of figure 2.9), the model correctly
predicts that few in the disadvantaged group will invest in the two highest levels of
education. Because the marginal benefit obtaining more education is lower when δ
is high, only those at the very top of the earning ability distribution will find higher
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Figure 2.9: Target Moments and Calibration for Wage Discrimination
education worthwhile. The model is less successful in replicating the significantly
lower fraction of black workers who have finished a four-year college degree. While
the model predicts more black workers in the high school graduate and some col-
lege/Associate’s degree categories, about the same fraction in both groups earn a
bachelor’s degree. The disadvantaged group does have more high school dropouts
than in the data, although as discussed above, the data for full-time noninstitutional-
ized workers does not capture much of what is happening at the bottom of the black
income/education distribution.
The model does a fairly good job of matching the median income levels by edu-
cation group. Figure 2.9 shows that in the middle four education levels, the model
is within four percentage points of the data. The wages for disadvantaged workers
in the model are too low for the high school dropouts and too high for those with a
PhD or professional degree. Note that the equilibrium median wage in the model is
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not simply 14% lower for the disadvantaged group at all education levels. The two
highest education levels, for example, have equilibrium wages nine percent and eight
percent lower than the advantaged group. This is because only disadvantaged work-
ers with very high earning ability will find it worthwhile to invest in these education
levels, so that the median earning ability at these education levels will be higher in
the disadvantaged group than for the advantaged group.
2.4.3.3 Intergenerational Income Transition Rates
In computing the model’s implications for intergenerational mobility, I must make an
assumption on the share of disadvantaged agents in the labor force, since this share
will affect the cutoffs for income quintiles. Black people make up approximately 12%
of the total U.S. population. However, the non-Hispanic white population is only
about 68%. I run two simulations, one with a disadvantaged population of about
12% and one with a share of 25%.
The first thing to note from the simulations is that, as in Malloy (2010), the model
generates a positive correlation of (log) wages between parents and children despite
the fact that earning ability is assumed to be independent across generations. For
the advantaged group the correlation of income is 0.146 and for the disadvantaged
group 0.138. The correlation of income pooling across groups is 0.164 in the simulation
assuming that the disadvantaged group is 12% of the total and 0.173 in the simulation
assuming a 25% share of disadvantaged workers. These numbers are well below the
estimated intergenerational correlation of income of around 0.6 found by Mazumder
(2005) and Mulligan (1997).
Table 2.5 shows the model’s intergenerational transition rates between income
quintiles, along with their empirical counterparts, found in Mazumder (2008). I
present two measures of the poverty trap and affluence net. The first, Poverty Trap
20 and Affluence Net 20, measures the likelihood of staying in the bottom (top) 20
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Table 2.5: Simulated Intergenerational Transition Rates with Wage Discrimination
Only (δ = 0.14)
Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 25.5% 18.9% 17.6% 24.9% 19.6%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 42.9% 73.3% 49.0% 38.7% 69.8% 48.2%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 45.5% 21.7% 44.5% 46.8% 30.2% 45.0%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 42.7% 50.8% 59.2% 41.9% 57.1%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 11.5% 5.3% 10.5% 13.8% 6.7% 11.8%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.0% 23.8% 17.3% 17.0% 22.3% 17.6%
* Mazumder (2008)
percent of the income distribution if you are born in the bottom (top) 20 percent.
The second measure, Poverty Trap 40 and Affluence Net 40, give the same likelihoods
if born in the bottom (top) 40% of the income distribution. I also present the Jump
Up rate, defined as the fraction going from the bottom 20% to the top 20%, and the
Fall Down rate, the fraction going from the top 20% to the bottom 20%.
As can be seen from the table, the simulation does fairly well in matching the
transition rates. In particular, it replicates the fact that black children have a much
higher fall down rate than jump up rate, as well as the fact that they face a larger
poverty trap and smaller affluence net than white children. There are two major
discrepancies between the model and the data. First, the model does a poor job
of matching the fall down rate for the white population. In the simulation the fall
down rate for the advantaged group is 17.0% as opposed to only 10.4% in the data.
Second, the model does a much better job of matching the 40% measure of the poverty
trap and affluence net than it does of matching the more narrow 20% measures. For
example, the poverty trap for the disadvantaged group is only around 25% in the
simulation when measured with just the bottom quintile, compared to 43.7% for
black families in the data. However, the Poverty Trap 40 measure is 67.6% in the
data for black children, while the model generates measures of 73.3% and 69.8% in
the two simulations. Similarly for the advantaged group, the wider measure of the
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affluence net does a better job of matching the data than does the more narrow
measure.
2.4.4 Lower Aspirations
If people in the disadvantaged group have lower aspirations, represented by aD < 0,
then they will measure utility against a lower reference point than their (otherwise
identical) peers in the group with standard aspirations (aA = 0). The empirical
rationale for including this possibility in the model was discussed in section 2.3 which
indicated that black children born in the bottom half of the income distribution
were less likely than their white counterparts to do better than their parents. If
this expectation has been internalized within the culture, then it may be perfectly
understandable that black students reduce their expectations of labor market success.
This, in turn, will affect the equilibrium level of education they choose and will affect
how likely they are to escape the poverty trap or be caught by the affluence net.
The model with aD < 0 can capture the possibility that lower education levels
among the black population are due to the effect of a different identity among black
students and different aspirations because of this identity. In this version of the
model, there is nothing intrinsically different in the disadvantaged population, such
as lower earning ability or lower wages due to labor market discrimination, to make
them choose less education. But because they self-identify with the group, they have
lower expectations of success, reducing the equilibrium level of education.
2.4.4.1 Decision Rule
Figure 2.10 plots the education decision rule for agents with ability one standard
deviation above the mean and a bequest of T = 0.25, both with normal aspirations
and with low aspirations (aD = −0.03). Lower aspirations have the same qualitative
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Figure 2.10: Education Decision Rule and Population Distribution with Low Aspira-
tions
effect as wage discrimination, shifting the curve representing the utility-maximizing
level of education to the left. At higher levels of reference consumption, those with
lower aspirations will choose the same or higher levels of education. This is because
it is easier for these people to avoid a first period loss than for those with the same
earnings ability and bequest but with a higher level of reference consumption. Dis-
advantaged workers at the bottom of the consumption distribution, meanwhile, will
choose the same or lower levels of education. The lower reference level of consump-
tion means that they may be able avoid a loss in the first period with a lower level of
education.
As with wage discrimination, the model’s result that some students with lower
aspirations are likely to get more education could help explain why some empirical
studies find that, controlling for education ability and family background, black stu-
dents choose more education than their white counterparts. But as we will see in
the next section, the equilibrium result of low aspirations is that the disadvantaged
group will wind up unconditionally with less education. Figure 2.10 shows this by
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Figure 2.11: Target Moments and Calibration for Low Aspirations
plotting the distribution of each group by reference consumption. The distribution
of the disadvantaged group is shifted to the left, although less so than with wage
discrimination of 14% in figure 2.8.
2.4.4.2 Matching Education and Wage Ratios
This section searches for a value of aD to match the distribution of education and
median income for black workers. I find that aD = −0.03 provides the best fit. Figure
2.11 presents the results for this case.
The calibration does fairly well at matching education levels with the exception of
implying too few Master’s degrees in the disadvantaged group. With lower aspirations,
agents are able to consume at their reference level of consumption with lower levels
of education. Thus, as the level of aspirations falls (or as aD becomes more negative),
fewer and fewer workers will invest in the highest levels of education. Table 6 shows
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Table 2.6: Education Distribution for Aspiration Levels
Education Level Data* aD = 0% = −1% = −2% = −3% = −4% = −5%
High school dropout 7.7% 8.8% 9.0% 8.9% 9.0% 9.3% 9.1%
High School Diploma 33.2% 23.8% 25.3% 25.6% 27.3% 28.9% 45.3%
Some College/Associate’s 32.7% 27.5% 29.5% 31.0% 32.4% 37.5% 31.1%
Bachelor’s Degree 18.6% 31.0% 29.0% 28.3% 26.7% 21.9% 12.5%
Master’s Degree 6.2% 7.2% 5.7% 5.0% 3.6% 2.0% 1.7%
PhD/Professional Degree 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.3% 1/0% 0.4% 0.4%
* Black, full-time workers, 25-64 years old, CPS
the distribution of education for aD = −1%,−2%, ...,−5%. The share of high school
dropouts stays stays roughly constant as aD becomes more negative, but the level
of Bachelor’s degrees, Master’s degrees, and PhD/Professional degrees fall steadily.
As a result, the shares of workers with only a high school degree or some level of
college short of a Bachelor’s degree increase. One possibility, not currently explored
in this paper, is that the degree of lower aspirations, or the value of aD, varies by
reference consumption level. It could be that those in the disadvantaged group at the
top of the consumption distribution have only slightly lower levels of aspirations than
the advantaged group while those at the bottom of the distribution have much lower
levels of aspirations. Allowing for heterogeneity in aspiration levels may enable the
model to do a better job in explaining the education distribution of black full-time
workers.
While the model with lower aspirations can match racial differences in education,
it completely fails in matching the median income by education level. Because there is
no wage discrimination in this simulation, the only way to change the median income
level is to significantly change the ability of those who are investing in each education
level. That is, unless the median earning ability of the median worker at each level of
education changes, there will be no change in the median income. When aspirations
are lower by 3%, as in figure 2.11, we can see that wages for the disadvantaged group
are the same as those in the advantaged group. While this is not true for all levels
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Table 2.7: Simulated Intergenerational Transition Rates with Low Aspirations Only
(aD = −0.03)
Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 18.0% 17.6% 17.6% 18.5% 17.8%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 46.7% 48.8% 47.0% 46.7% 50.6% 47.6%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 46.1% 39.0% 45.5% 45.5% 39.6% 44.5%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 49.6% 51.2% 51.4% 49.2% 51.0%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 10.4% 10.1% 10.3% 11.5% 10.0% 11.2%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.2% 18.5% 17.3% 17.0% 16.9% 17.0%
* Mazumder (2008)
of aD, the median wage is just as likely to be (slightly) higher as it is to be (slightly)
lower. This makes complete sense given that the underlying distribution of earnings
ability is the same in each group. In order to explain the consistently lower wages for
black workers at every level of education, we will have to look elsewhere.
2.4.4.3 Intergenerational Income Transition Rates
Despite the fact that the model with only lower aspirations is unable to match the
median income by education level, it still is able to generate slight differences in in-
tergenerational transition rates between groups that are in the right direction. This
is because the lower aspirations cause the education distribution for the disadvan-
taged group to shift to the left due to the leftward shift in reference consumption
plotted in figure 2.10. This shift makes it more likely that some disadvantaged agents
born in the bottom 20% or 40% of the income distribution will stay poor as agents
with low reference consumption will invest in less education than they would with
standard aspirations as shown in figure 2.10. Table 2.7 gives the intergenerational
transition rates when aspirations are lower for the disadvantaged group by 3%. The
disadvantaged group has a (slightly) higher poverty trap and affluence net than the
advantaged group in the simulations, but not by enough to match the data.
101
Table 2.8: Simulated Intergenerational Transition Rates with Low Aspirations Only
(aD = −0.05)
Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 16.5% 17.4% 17.6% 17.0% 17.4%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 42.9% 64.8% 46.9% 40.6% 65.7% 48.4%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 45.5% 26.7% 44.1% 45.5% 31.8% 43.7%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 43.4% 50.9% 59.2% 51.0% 58.1%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 11.5% 10.5% 11.4% 11.5% 10.2% 11.2%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.0% 17.1% 17.2% 17.0% 17.7% 17.1%
* Mazumder (2008)
Table 2.8 provides the transition rates when aspirations for the disadvantaged
group are lower by 5%. From table 2.6, this level of aD generates too large a shift in
the education distribution, especially at the higher levels of education. From table
2.8, however, this level of lower aspirations does a much better job of matching the
poverty trap for black children born in the lower 40% of the income distribution. It
also reduces the affluence net for the disadvantaged group born in the top 20% of the
income distribution, although not far enough to match the data. Overall, this table
does lend support to the idea that lower aspirations may be one of the factors driving
the poverty trap among black families.
2.4.5 Lower Earning Ability
Some studies find that black students do not have the same skills as their white
counterparts. For example, Neal and Johnson (1996) find that the distribution of
scores for black students in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is shifted
down compared to their white counterparts. One plausible explanation is that black
students get lower quality early education than their white counterparts. As discussed
in section 2.3, Card and Krueger (1992) find that the reduction in the black-white
wage gap from 1960 to 1980 can partially be explained by an increase in the quality
of education for black students. Maxwell (1994) finds that controlling for the quality
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of education can explain much of the black-white wage gap.
In this section, I examine a version of the model that allows for a different dis-
tribution of earning ability, ψ, between the two groups. I allow for three possible
differences in the distribution: a mean shift; a shift in the maximum level; and a
shift in the minimum level. A shift in the mean would correspond to a ubiquitous
difference in the quality of education between black and white students. A decrease in
only the minimum level would represent the idea that the main cause of black-white
differences is the very bottom of the earning ability distribution. Regardless of the
type of shift, the assumption of independence of earning ability across generations
(ρ = 0) is maintained in these experiments.
2.4.5.1 Decision Rule
Perhaps the most important thing to note when the distribution of earning ability is
different between the two groups is that such differences will have no effect whatsoever
on the education decision rule. That is, for a given earning ability, bequest, and
reference level of consumption, the chosen level of education will be exactly the same
whether a person is in the advantaged group or the disadvantaged group. The major
change, discussed in the next section, will be the equilibrium distribution of education.
If there are fewer people at the high end of earnings ability, there will be fewer people
who choose to invest in professional degrees or PhDs. If there are more people at the
lower end of the earning ability distribution, there will be more high school dropouts.
But no matter what the education distribution, the wages of each worker will still
depend only on education and earning ability, not on the group to which they belong.
This result of the model should be entirely obvious once stated. In this model
there is no reason for someone from the disadvantaged group (with the same reference
consumption and bequest) to get more or less education as compared to someone
from the advantaged group with the same earning ability. So long as there is no
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wage discrimination, wages of each group at each education level will be the same,
and the only thing that will change is the distribution of education levels within each
population.
2.4.5.2 Matching Education and Wage Ratios
The distribution of ψD that does the best job of matching the target moments for
the black full-time working population is one that drops the maximum value earnings
ability by approximately 6%, keeps the minimum value the same, and therefore re-
duces the mean ability by approximately 3%. The calibration results are graphed in
figure 2.12. The major discrepancy compared to the observed education distribution
is that there are more high school dropouts. As explained above, this may not truly
be a weakness given the number of black people who are not in the labor force and
do not have a high school degree. Although the distribution of ψ for disadvantaged
workers has the same minimum as for advantaged workers, there is still a fatter left
hand tail of the distribution for disadvantaged workers as the standard deviation stays
the same for the two groups so that more disadvantaged agents in the model will hit
up against the minimum3. Anybody to the left of a certain value of ψ will find it
optimal to drop out of high school and start work as soon as possible.
This simulation, similar to the case with lower aspirations only, does a poor job of
matching the median income by education level. As show in figure 2.12, the median
income levels are almost exactly the same in both the advantaged and disadvantaged
groups. The only difference is a slight decrease at the some college/Associate’s degree
level because of a slightly larger population in that group that is shifted slightly to
the left in terms of earning ability due to the different distribution. Simulations with
other leftward shifts in the distribution of earning ability for the disadvantaged group
3This is without loss of generality as the cutoff for those who find it optimal to not invest in any
additional education is above the minimum value of ability.
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Figure 2.12: Target Moments and Calibration for Lower Earning Ability
showed similar results on relative wages, sometimes with an education group having
slightly higher median income, sometimes slightly lower, but usually the same.
These simulation results challenge the findings discussed above that attribute
much of the black-white wage gap to lower ability in black workers, whether due to
unobserved cognitive ability, as in Urzua (2008), or lower educational quality, as in
Maxwell (1994). The only way that lower earning ability could reduce the median
income at a given education level in this model would be for those with lower earning
ability in the disadvantaged group to get more education than their counterparts in
the advantaged group. In this case, the wage would be lower, controlling for education,
for the disadvantaged group because they would have lower inherent earnings ability
for a given level of education. But this can only be true if the education decision rule
differs by group, perhaps because of different aspirations.
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Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 19.9% 17.9% 17.6% 19.6% 18.1%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 46.7% 53.4% 47.6% 46.7% 53.6% 48.4%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 46.1% 39.8% 45.5% 45.5% 41.5% 44.8%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 46.3% 50.9% 51.4% 46.2% 50.4%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 10.4% 8.4% 10.1% 11.5% 9.1% 10.9%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.2% 20.4% 17.5% 17.0% 21.2% 17.8%
* Mazumder (2008)
2.4.5.3 Intergenerational Income Transition Rates
Shifting the distribution of the earning ability of the disadvantaged group to the
left implies a larger population that will have low earnings, especially at the bottom
two levels of education. This shift will also reduce the number at the top who will
find it optimal to invest in the highest levels of education. Table 2.9 shows the
intergenerational transition rates when disadvantaged workers have a mean earning
ability three percent lower than advantaged workers. As expected, the poverty trap is
higher for the disadvantaged group, although it is not as high as in the data or as in
the simulation with only wage discrimination (table 2.6). In addition, both measures
of the affluence net are lower for the disadvantaged group, as is the jump up rate.
However, none of the measures are as close to the data as in the simulation with
only wage discrimination and the model is unable to match the median income levels
by education. These results, along with the results for median income by education
level, would seem to question whether or not lower quality primary and secondary
education (or anything else that affects earning ability during childhood) is really the
driving force behind the black-white wage gap.
106
2.4.6 Allowing More than One Difference Between Groups
The goal of this section is to see if the model can more accurately match the target
moments using either two or all three of the group differences in combination. Given
the data discussed in section 2.3 there is reason to think that the black-white wage gap
may have more than one cause. It’s possible, for example, that wage discrimination
could lead to lower aspirations as members of the disadvantaged group see that they
are not treated fairly in the labor market. This would not be completely irrational as
membership in the disadvantaged group is passed down from parent to child so that
both face the same level of labor market discrimination. However, if shared experience
of discrimination leads to a group identity, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), then it
may also lead to lower aspirations and a defining down of success.
It is also possible that members of the disadvantaged group receive lower quality
education and are, on average, less productive than member of the advantaged group.
In this case, it is possible that employers use a rule of thumb when setting wages that
leads to labor market discrimination. In this case, the discrimination would not be ra-
tional. As shown in the previous section, when investment in education is endogenous
and there is no labor market discrimination, members of the disadvantaged group who
invest in a particular level of education will be virtually identical in terms of ability
to those in the advantaged group who choose the same level of education. But if em-
ployers do not understand this and there is a pervasive belief that the disadvantaged
group is less productive because they receive lower quality education, this belief could
be enough to sustain some level of wage discrimination.
2.4.6.1 Calibration
A model without wage discrimination, so that δ = 0, but with lower aspirations and a
lower average earning ability for the disadvantaged group does no better in matching
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the target moments than a model with only one or the other. This should not be
surprising as both of these versions of the model fail to match the lower median
income levels for all education groups for black workers that we see in the data. Both
of these mechanisms push the disadvantaged group to invest less in education so that
the model can do a fair job in matching the education distribution of black workers,
but they cannot account for the lower income levels conditioned on education. In order
for the model to match relative incomes, we need a version with wage discrimination.
The calibrated model that allows for a shift in the earning ability of the disad-
vantaged group and wage discrimination does a better job of matching the target
moments than the version with only the shift in earning ability. These results are
presented in figure 2.13. This figure shows results for a model assuming a drop in the
minimum value of ψD of 6%, so that the average is reduced by approximately 3%, and
a value of δ = 10%. There are two things of interest to note here. First, this version
does no better than the experiment that relied solely on wage discrimination. In fact,
its fit (measured by the norm of the differences between the data and the simulation)
is marginally worse. Second, the level of wage discrimination that provides the best
fir is actually less than in the calibration with only wage discrimination (δ = 10% as
opposed to δ = 14%). The lower earning ability in some sense reinforces the wage
discrimination so that we need lower levels of overt wage discrimination to match the
target moments from the data.
A model with wage discrimination and lower aspirations (but no shift in the
distribution of earning ability) does a better job of matching the target moments
than any of the other versions that rely on one or two difference mechanisms. The
target moments with values of δ = 11% and aD = −2% are presented in figure 2.14.
The main weakness in this experiment is that it implies relatively too many people
in the disadvantaged group investing in a Bachelor’s degree and too few in some
level of college less than a BA. But once again the calibration shows that less overt
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Figure 2.13: Target Moments and Calibration for Lower Earning Ability and Wage
Discrimination
discrimination is needed to fit the data when one of the other mechanisms in the
model works along with discrimination.
Finally, I use all three parameters available in the model to see if I can improve
on the results using just wage discrimination and aspirations. The parameter values
that do the best job of matching the target moments are a wage discrimination value
of 12%, lower aspirations of 1%, and lower earning ability of 1.6%. Interestingly, this
calibration is actually slightly worse than the version with only wage discrimination
and low aspirations. It does a slightly better job of matching the median income
levels, but not as good a job of matching the education distribution. Results are
presented in figure 2.15.
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Figure 2.14: Target Moments and Calibration for Lower Aspirations and Wage Dis-
crimination
Figure 2.15: Target Moments and Calibration for Lower Aspirations, Lower Ability,
and Wage Discrimination
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Table 2.10: Simulated Intergenerational Transition Rates with Wage Discrimination




Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 25.8% 19.0% 17.6% 26.5% 20.3%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 42.9% 74.4% 49.1% 40.6% 68.1% 49.3%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 45.4% 23.0% 43.3% 46.8% 32.5% 45.2%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 46.7% 51.1% 59.2% 43.8% 57.1%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 11.5% 5.6% 10.4% 13.8% 6.6% 11.6%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.0% 25.3% 17.5% 17.0% 26.9% 18.1%
* Mazumder (2008)
2.4.6.2 Intergenerational Income Transition Rates
The simulations with more than one factor do a fairly good job of matching the
intergenerational transition rates between income quintiles. Specifically, they increase
the poverty trap of the bottom quintile for the disadvantaged group (although none
of the models are able to generate a high enough poverty trap for the bottom 20%
to match the data). The multi-factor models are also able to reduce the affluence
net, reduce the jump up rate, and increase the fall down rate for the disadvantaged
group. However, these results are only marginally better (in terms of fit measured
by the norm of the differences) than the simulation with only wage discrimination.
Table 2.10 gives the transition rates for the model with wage discrimination and a
shift in the earning ability of the disadvantaged group. The fall down rate is actually
a bit high, although that seems to be a general weakness of the model as it currently
stands. The model is still not able to generate a small enough affluence net for those in
the disadvantaged group born in the top 40% of the income distribution. Such a low
affluence net for black families seems to be one of the more curious, and important,
aspects of the data4.
The transition rates for the simulation using both wage discrimination and lower
4While the affluence nets for black families in Mazumder (2008) using the NLSY seem very small,
Hertz (2005) found even smaller affluence nets using the PSID.
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Table 2.11: Simulated Intergenerational Transition Rates with Wage Discrimination
(δ = 0.11) and Low Aspirations (aD = −0.02)
Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 21.5% 18.2% 17.6% 26.9% 20.1%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 42.9% 72.1% 48.8% 40.6% 63.5% 47.6%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 45.5% 31.2% 44.8% 46.8% 33.4% 45.5%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 41.3% 50.8% 59.2% 43.0% 57.3%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 11.5% 5.0% 10.5% 13.8% 6.6% 11.8%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.0% 23.9% 17.4% 17.0% 21.4% 17.4%
* Mazumder (2008)
Table 2.12: Simulated Intergenerational Transition Rates with Wage Discrimination





Data* Simulation (D = 12%) Simulation (D = 25%)
Transition Rate White Black Total Adv. Disadv. Total Adv. Disadv. Total
Poverty Trap 20 24.9% 43.7% 33.5% 17.6% 26.5% 19.2% 17.6% 26.6% 20.3%
Poverty Trap 40 44.6% 67.6% 52.8% 42.9% 71.8% 48.6% 40.6% 64.6% 48.2%
Affluence Net 20 38.9% 21.3% 37.8% 45.5% 21.3% 44.5% 46.8% 27.2% 45.0%
Affluence Net 40 54.3% 31.3% 52.8% 51.4% 43.4% 50.9% 59.2% 43.7% 57.4%
Jump Up 10.6% 4.1% 7.4% 11.5% 4.7% 10.3% 13.8% 6.0% 11.4%
Fall Down 10.4% 21.6% 10.9% 17.0% 29.8% 17.6% 17.0% 27.2% 17.9%
* Mazumder (2008)
aspirations are presented in table 2.11. There is, in fact, very little difference between
these rates and those in table 2.10. Wage discrimination appears to be the main
driving force behind intergenerational mobility in this model. The transition rates
with all three factors are given in table 2.12.
2.5 Generational Transitions
Between the implementation of the Jim Crow system of segregation at the end of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the Civil Rights movements, many black
workers faced both severe labor market discrimination and a lower quality education
system than their white counterparts. As noted above, Card and Krueger (1992)
found that the black-white wage gap was about 40% in 1960 in the midst of the Civil
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Rights movement. This had fallen to 25% by 1980 and is currently about 14% today
(controlling only for the level of education), according to the CPS. Education rates
for black and white workers were quite different in 1960 than they are today, both
in absolute terms and in relative terms. The black-white education gap according to
the U.S. Census from 1960-2005 is graphed in figure 2.16. One of the reasons for the
relative difference was no doubt discrimination. Black students in many areas of the
country simply did not have easy access to post-secondary education. Another reason,
documented in Card and Krueger (1992), was the fact that the quality of education,
especially in the segregated South, was worse for black students than white students.
Finally, given that the wage gap was so high, there was less reason for black students
to continue to invest in education as the marginal benefit of doing so was lower. One
peculiarity of the data is that the ratio of black high school dropouts to white high
school dropouts actually increased after the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s, which
made it illegal to discriminate in the labor market based on race. While the drop out
rate for workers from both groups fell (from 56.8% to 17.4% for white workers and
from 78.3% to 32.3%) from 1960 to 1980, it fell much faster for white workers, so that
the ratio rose from 1.38 in 1960 to 1.86 in 1980.
If lower aspirations do indeed play a role in the level of education investment, then
even in the rosiest post-Civil Rights scenario the education distribution for black and
white workers would not equalize in the first generation. One reasonable question is
how many generations it would take for black workers to invest in the same levels of
education as white workers if labor market discrimination went from 40% to 0% after
the civil rights legislation in the 1960s. It’s difficult to accurately estimate the value
of labor market discrimination that would match the education distribution in the
1960s as the underlying wage function, and especially the return to education, has
changed so substantially. But we can ask, if the civil rights legislation was completely
successful in wiping out labor market discrimination and reduced overt discrimination
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Figure 2.16: Black-White Education Ratio, 1960-2005 (1.00 = Equality)
Source: Current Population Survey, U.S. Census
to zero, how long would it take for the education distribution of black workers to
equalize to that of white workers?
I assume that the economy starts in a steady state with wage discrimination of
40% (δ = 0.4 in the model) and then experiences an immediate and permanent decline
in δ to zero. At first, I assume that aspirations are constant across the two groups
so that aA = aD = 0. With loss aversion and reference consumption that looks
to the previous generation, the elimination of discrimination has some unexpected
consequences. Because the marginal benefit of each level of education has increased
so dramatically, many agents in the disadvantaged group can now avoid a loss by
choosing a lower amount of education. The relative number of dropouts, compared
to the advantaged group, spikes in the first generation after the wage discrimination
is eliminated and then begins slowly to fall to that of the advantaged group. There is
a corresponding fall and then increase in the higher levels of education. This matches
what we see in figure 2.16, but the process takes quite a long time in the model.
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Figure 2.17: Disadvantaged-Advantaged Education Ratios Before and After Elimina-
tion of Wage Discrimination (δ = 0.4)
It takes 16 generations for the level of Bachelor’s degrees and doctoral degrees in
the disadvantaged population to equal that of the advantaged group. The transition
process is pictured in figure 2.17 which graphs the disadvantaged-advantaged ratio of
the percentage of each group at each education level.
The other question in the transition is what happens to median wages at each
education level. Interestingly, in the model, the median wage of the disadvantaged
group becomes immediately higher than that of the advantaged group at most edu-
cation levels. This is because of the change in the ability ranges of the disadvantaged
group that invest in each level of education. For example, 24% of the population
decides to invest in the lowest level of education immediately following the shock. In
this population are workers who have much higher inherent earning ability than the
8-9% of the advantaged population that invests in this level of education. It takes
six generations for the median income levels of each group to be within 5% of each
other, but this is because the median wages of the disadvantaged group need to come
down, rather than up. This process is pictured in figure 2.18.
The above simulations assume that aspirations are the same for both the advan-
taged and disadvantaged group. The reference consumption level is inherited from the
previous generation, so reference consumption is lower initially for the disadvantaged
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Figure 2.18: Disadvantaged-Advantaged Wage Ratio Before and After Elimination of
Wage Discrimination (δ = 0.4)
workers due to the legacy of lower wages, but there are no permanent differences in
aspirations. If lower aspirations become entrenched in the disadvantaged group, then
the results in section 2.4 imply that the education distribution will never equalize
between the groups. When aspirations are 3% lower for the disadvantaged group, it
takes 43 generations for the disadvantaged group to reach 80% of the share of Bach-
elor’s degrees in the advantaged group, and the share of PhD/professional degrees
for disadvantaged workers never reaches 80% of the share of advantaged workers. On
the other hand, there is little change in how median wage levels equalize. Within six
generations, the median wage levels of the disadvantaged group come down to within
5% of the advantaged group.
Of course, it is unlikely that wage discrimination would disappear overnight. In
addition, some of the black-white wage gap in 1960 was no doubt due to the lower
quality of education for black students, as claimed by Card and Krueger (1992). Both
the quality of education and cultural norms that lead to wage discrimination take time
to change. One useful exercise would be to see how long it would take to reach equality
of median income by education levels and the distribution of education, assuming a
given half-life of discrimination. For instance, if the level of wage discrimination is
40% in generation 0, 20% in generation 1, and 10% in generation 2, then the half-life
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Figure 2.19: Disadvantaged-Advantaged Education Ratio with Half-Life of Wage Dis-
crimination of One Generation
of discrimination is one generation. The level of discrimination decreases by 50%
every generation. If the half life is more than one generation it will take longer to
reach equality whereas if it is less we will reach equality more quickly. When Card and
Krueger were writing in the early 1990s, there appeared to be some level of optimism
as the black-white wage gap had fallen fairly substantially in the twenty years from
1960 to 1980, partly due to increases in the quality of education. Now there seems to
be less cause for optimism. For example, there is very little difference in the current
black-white wage gaps for 25-34 year olds and for 35-44 year olds. And both of those
wage gaps are only slightly lower than that of 45-54 year olds.
I simulate the model assuming a level of wage discrimination starting at 40%
which decreases by half over the next four generations so that it is 20% in generation
0, 10% in generation 1, 5% in generation 2, and 0% in generation 3. The educa-
tion convergence rate, pictured in figure 2.19, is somewhat slower than in the model
in which wage discrimination disappears immediately. It takes 19 generations for
the Bachelor’s degree rate of the disadvantaged group to come within 80% of the
advantaged group and 20 generations for the doctoral degree rate to do the same.
Interestingly, after 70 generations, there is still a fairly significant difference in the
education distribution, as the disadvantaged group has 15% more doctoral degrees
and 18% fewer Master’s degrees.
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Wages, perhaps surprisingly, behave in much the same way as in the model in
which discrimination was immediately eliminated. The only significant difference is
that because wage discrimination is cut in half in each generation, the education
distribution is different so that there is a spike first in high school graduates and
college graduates, pushing up the median wage in these two groups more quickly.
In period zero, when overt wage discrimination is still 20%, only the groups of high
school dropouts and those with some college have median earnings less than 97%
of the advantaged group. In period 2 when the discrimination is 5%, the median
earnings of the disadvantaged group are higher at each education level than that of
the advantaged group due to the shift in who is investing in each level of education.
Cutting wage discrimination in half over each generation may strike some as overly
optimistic (and perhaps others as overly pessimistic). I next simulate the model
with wage discrimination decreasing by 10% each generation for four generations.
The dynamics are fairly close to the half-life model. The only difference is that the
slower pace delays the spike in high school dropouts for an extra generation. This
leads to lower initial levels of high school dropouts in the first two generations, but
higher levels after that. After about ten generations, the simulations are virtually
identical. Because labor market discrimination is decreasing more slowly, median
wage levels take longer to equalize. This means lower initial median earnings for the
disadvantaged group, especially at the lower levels of education. It takes another
generation for these groups to pass the median earnings of the advantaged group due
to the shift in the population that is investing in each level of education.
2.6 Conclusion
The model presented here does a good job of matching the education distribution of
black workers and a fair job matching the intergenerational transition rates between
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income quintiles. The model struggles in simulating the very large poverty trap
experienced by black families in the lowest quintile of the income distribution. One
possibility suggested by the simulations is that those born into the bottom quintile
have much lower aspirations than those born above them in the income distribution.
This would suggest that the existence of a large poverty trap is a self-fulfilling cycle,
needing more creative policies to help eliminate the cycle of poverty. If low aspirations
are truly to blame, increasing the aspirations among students at all levels and making
higher education more accessible would help reduce the poverty trap.
All three mechanisms in the model, wage discrimination, low aspirations, and
lower earning ability, are able to shift the education distribution and do a fair job of
matching the black-white education gap that we see in the data. However, only wage
discrimination can explain the persistent black-white wage gap that we see at every
education level in the data. Because education is treated as an endogenous variable
so that each agent chooses the level of education to invest in to maximize utility, we
do not see persistently lower wages controlling for education level when the model
has only low aspirations and/or lower earning ability.
It could be argued that the black-white education gap and black-white earnings
gap are simply the result of transitioning from a system of overt wage discrimination to
one of equality. While simulations of this transition in the model lend some credence
to this possibility for the education distribution, the results are much less plausible
for median wage levels. For example, the model may help explain why we see a spike
in the black-white ratio of high school dropouts in the generation after the adoption
of Civil Rights legislation. However, in this model, once discrimination is eliminated
in the labor market, median wage levels for each group either equalize, or if there is a
large shift in the education distribution of the disadvantaged group due to the role of
reference consumption, invert, so that the median income of the disadvantaged group
is actually higher. These transitions towards equality in the model are so slow that
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they suggest the model may not be capturing how reference levels are truly formed.
The generation of black workers after the end of Jim Crow would not have made such
large gains as they did if they had been satisfied with the place their parents had
occupied in the income distribution.
Before I would feel comfortable concluding that the black-white wage gap is due
solely to wage discrimination, there are at least two mechanisms outside of this model
that deserve further exploration. The first, popular in the labor market literature
explaining sex discrimination, is the possibility that prejudice or preference leads
black workers into different fields of study than their white counterparts. If these
different fields have significant pay differences then it may not be overt labor market
discrimination that is leading to the black white-wage gap. This doesn’t mean that
prejudice or discrimination may not be the root cause, but it may mean the policy
solution is much more complicated.
The second possibility is that black students do in fact receive a lower quality
education, but that this does not generate a shift in earning ability as measured by
the parameter ψ in the model, but rather changes the return to higher education, as
captured by the parameters α1, α2, and ζ in the wage function. It is possible, in this
case, that we could see some level of a black-white wage gap when there is a shift in
the underlying distribution of earning ability. I leave this possibility for future work.
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